The Research Of Mechanism To Prevent Corruption In China's Engineering Tender

Nowadays, there exist many corruptions in China's engineering tender, resulting in many low-quality projects. Just as a saying goes, an administration falls while a building rises. Quite a few transport commissioners and assistant commissioners are caught due to their corruption, therefore, it is urgent to fight against corruption in engineering field. Enough attention must be paid to setting up corresponding mechanisms to prevent corruption from arising.This thesis firstly introduces the origin of tender and the history of China's tender, and then analyzes the specific presentations of corruption in China's tender, the reasons and the corresponding severe consequences. It points out that corruption can be divided into human nature corruption and system corruption. This thesis analyzes the theory foundation of tender from the perspective of game theory. It indicates that tender can play a role of selecting the best from many participants; however, this system's proper operation is based on several supposed conditions. At the same time, the consignment-deputy theory of information economics is also introduced into this thesis. In terms of this aspect, it analyzes the consignment-deputy relation in projects' tender and the adverse selection and moral risks existing among agents, and accordingly indicates that the corruption is the representation of the adverse selection and moral risks, and that to prevent corruption is to weaken the adverse selection and moral risks existing among agents. Based on the above analysis, the thesis suggests the ways to regulate the behaviors of all parties involved in a tendering, namely the ways to prevent human nature corruption from arising; on the other hand it suggests the ways to regulate the actions of government, owners, contractors, and agencies, of which the focus is on how to regulate the action of government in projects' tender. In addition, how to prevent the system corruption by perfecting corresponding systems is also included in this thesis, mainly analyzing how to perfect and improve the current tender mode and the evaluation system of tender, and suggesting how to apply fuzzy mathematics to the evaluation of tender and presenting an example as the illustration, thus, the limitations existing in traditional evaluation method can be well avoided.This thesis combines theory and practice, in search of the intercross and combination of disciplinaries. On the basis of China's actualities, it defines the measures and suggestions to prevent the corruption of China's tender, as a result, it has some practical implications and reference values.