A Resolution Of Credit Rationing Of Chinese Private Enterprises: A Theoretical Analysis From The Perspective Of Corporate Governance

Since the end of 1970's, Chinese private enterprises have developed quickly. But nowadays, they have to face the difficulty of financing and it has become one of the primary problems. Especially, private enterprises have to face the problem of credit rationing in these years. Lots of private enterprises complain that it is difficult to obtain credit from commercial banks. On the other hand, a lot of free money stagnates in banking system.Firstly, it is necessary for us to explain the phenomenon. From the perspective of imperfect information between private enterprises and banks, following the thread of adverse selection and moral hazard in the credit market, this thesis will introduce two footstones of corporate governance theory: transaction cost theory and principal-agent theory. Based on the theory of western credit rationing, the thesis will revise the classical model (Model S-W). It is concluded that the internal reason of credit rationing of Chinese private enterprises is that the institutional defaults of corporate governance of private enterprises and commercial banks.Secondly, the thesis will put forward the policy suggestions on making effective improvements of credit rationing-the answers to taking a temporary resolution and affecting a permanent cure from the internal and external perspectives.Lastly, the coarse prospect of harmonious development of the relationship between Chinese private enterprises and commercial banks in the future will have been made.