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An Economic Analysis Of The Land Policy In Rural China

Posted on:2006-07-19Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L XuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2156360152997907Subject:National Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As for as the research of the Land Policy in Rural China, there are a lot of problems. One is that the explanations to the phenomenon of land utilities in rural china are not so deep. Another is that the analysis ,the commendation and the correlated policy suggestion to the present land policy lack accurate demonstration and scientificity. Thus, the paper will try to renewedly explain some important aspects of the series phenomenon and do deep research to the present land policy and on this base I will give my own opinions and policy suggestions. Chapter one is the preface. Chapter two is the concise review to the land policy of new China. Explaining the phenomenon of the idle land in rural China is the main content of chapter three. This paper will demonstrate that there is not inevitable correlation between idle land and household responsibility system. The reason that the land as the basic production element is idle is that the profit is too low so the peasants transfer their labor force to other areas. The result is that the labor force detaches from the land and the land is idle. In chapter four I will analysis the land circulation. I will analysis the deep reason of the undeveloped land market in rural China after the concise review of the land circulation from the point of economic history. And then I will discuss the so-called opinion of cultivating the land market. This paper demonstrates that the condition for developing large-scale land market is not enough and the market of high liquidity can't come into being in short time. This paper also suggests that the government can't cultivate the land market and it can only grow from itself. The behaviors that execute forcibly the so-called policy of quickening the land circulation will only run in the opposite. Wile chapter five is one of core of this paper. This chapter is an economic analysis of the Land Rights Fixed for 30 Years in rural China. In this part I will discuss the stimulation and the restriction of long-term investment and analysis that different land regulation will result in different stimulation to the long-term investment. Chapter six is the conclusion and also an expectation to the future land policy of rural China on the base of present conditions. Last I would propose my own opinions. The main conclusions of this paper are the bellows: Firstly, there are no inevitable correlation between present Household Responsibility System and the Idle Land. The reason that there are idle lands in some areas of rural China is that the cost of agriculture is too high and the profit is too low. The peasants would rather go out and sale their own labor force in other forms for higher income. Thus the labor force and the land divorce. So the fundamental way that we solve the problem of Idle Land is that the government should increase the allowance and support to agriculture in order to increase the profit and cultivate the peasant's initiative of farming. Secondly, there is inheriting reason that the land market is undeveloped. The existing research demonstrates that the land system hold the development of land market don't necessarily come into existence. The reason that the land market is undeveloped is that now China doesn't exist the buyer of land market. Moreover, because of the present economic condition, specialization of agriculture and the effect of Chinese traditional culture the possibility of appearing larger scale land market is small. Last, we also believe that we should consider more about the present theory---the so-called cultivating land market because the land market can only grow from the discourse of economy development. The expectation of cultivating it from outside can only spoil things by excessive enthusiasm or try to do the impossible. Thirdly, the present point that the existing land system weakens the enthusiasmof the peasant for long-term investment should also be considered again. The theory analysis of the paper demonstrates: Fist, though the central set the policy of land rights fixed for 30 years, the...
Keywords/Search Tags:Land Rights Fixed for 30 Years, Idle Land, Rural Long-term Investment, Land Market
PDF Full Text Request
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