A Study Of The Relationship Of Government Performance Management And Rent-seeking Restraint

Impact of rent-seeking has been the key factor in the performance of public administration. The allocation of public power resources has a crucial function in public administration. Essentially, the public authority performer is also a "rational man" driven by profit, when the rent-seeking profit is far greater than the cost of supervision and punishment, the "rational" public power will maximize the pursuit of personal interests by means of implementing rent-seeking behavior. Meanwhile, the public authority have the power of resources reallocation, this makes the public power prefers to lead to rent-seeking issues when lack of supervision, thereby reducing the level of government performance management. Therefore, this article aims to do in-depth analysis of rent-seeking behavours, to improve the methods and paths of government performance managementIn my standpoint, the key of preventing rent-seeking is how to reward and punish public power executives according to observable information (government administrative act, income of public interest aspect and etc) to motivate them to take the most favorable action to the public. With the help of information economics, this paper apply principal-agent theory To solve this problem. This paper analyzes the game relationship between public power executive and public to investigate the key factors of public power rent-seeking activity, which provides theoretical basis and countermeasures to restrict rent-seeking activity. This paper makes the study of rent-seeking activity through Government Performance Management Innovation and from three aspects of how to obtain and use performance evaluation information, how to achieve the standardization and normalization of performance evaluation, and how to optimize the assessment of government performance, and provide suggestions.Rent-seeking by the authority of government, is a hot issue both in government and academia. Scholars according to a lot of theories and practice innovation, from different perspectives, to explore the effective way to manage governmental authority rent-seeking behavior, also gain a lot of beneficial effects. This paper uses government performance evaluation (the information system with the evaluation and supervision functions) as a management tool to survey the performance of rent-seeking, providing some political suggestions about how to regulate power rent-seeking behavior and make innovative study in the following three aspects:First, a theoretical innovation. On the basis of the theory of public entrusted responsibility, this paper reveals the connection of government performance assessment and power rent-seeking to achieve a theoretical innovation. Second is the methodological innovation. This paper uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods, which is the theory of principal-agent theory in information economics, to analyze the game relationship between public power executive and public to investigate the key factors of public power rent-seeking activity, which provides theoretical basis and countermeasures to contain rent-seeking behavior. Third is the innovation of the practice. Based on Government Performance Evaluation aspect to analyze the power rent-seeking issues, from practice to explore the related mechanisms innovation in Government Performance Evaluation and find ways to solve power rent-seeking behavior.To solve the problem of corruption like power seek-renting is a complex system engineering, which is also a global problem. As the slow process of developing democracy, democratic politics is not mature enough, the space for Government to run rent-seeking is very big under the circumstances of imperfect legal system and weak moral constraint, which is also exist in developed country. Thus, both in depth and breadth this provides us wide research space.