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Study On Institutional Rent-Seeking Of Land Requisition In China

Posted on:2005-09-13Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F ShenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2156360122989055Subject:Land Resource Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
This thesis focuses on the course of land requisition-granting in China and analyzes the economic influence of land market from land requisition system during the course of commercial land requisition-granting, by theoretically and empirically analyzing means and on the basis of rent-seeking economics theory, in order to find out the economic mechanism of institutional rent. In the end, the thesis discusses the gaming problems during the course of institutional rent-seeking of land requisition.The thesis is divided into six parts. The first part is "Introduction", which is told about background of topic selecting, significance, technical course and framework. The second part is "Economic Explanation for Institutional Rent-Seeking of Land Requisition", as the theoretical core of the whole thesis, which is mainly to analyze and compare the changes of land supply and demand, the influence of potential equilibrium of land market, the theoretical institutional rent and the changes of economic welfare under the barrier of land requisition system. The third part is "Estimation of Institutional Rent of Land Requisition", which is expatiated on how to estimate the institutional rent and the rent results according to 35 sample-cities over China. The fourth part is a case study of Tangshan city, which demonstrates the theoretical conclusions in the second part and the institutional rent results in the third part. The fifth part is "Analyses by Game Theory in Institutional Rent-Seeking of Land Requisition", whose emphases are the games between the government and the rural collective, and the internal games inside the government (the game between central government and local government; the game between some tenure of local government and next one). The last part is "Conclusions and Discussions": the primary conclusion is that the government should make dissipation of institutional rent by inducting competitive factors into the collective-land requisition market; the problems remaining to be studied are listed.
Keywords/Search Tags:Property-Rights Economics, Institutional Rent-Seeking, Land Requisition System, Land Revenue-Distribution, Games
PDF Full Text Request
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