The Mechanism And Influence Evaluation Of Rent-seeking In Contemporary Russian Society

This paper is divided into three parts.The first part(chapter one)deeply explored and studied the theories and researches of rent-seeking and government-business relationship.The second part includes chapter two and chapter three,mainly about Russia's social rent-seeking phenomenon,the analysis of the Russian social rent-seeking structure,and analysis of rent-seeking's influence on the political and business relations and the Russian economy.The third part(chapter four)evaluated the enterprise performance and macro-economy from point of rent-seeking.The rent-seeking level of Russia is higher than most transition countries involved in this paper.Corruption has become a key impediment to Russian enterprises.The rent-seeking behavior in Russian society is widespread,partly because of the inevitability of rent-seeking,and on the other hand,which is determined by the privatization reform carried out in the process of Russian transformation and its specific historical background.Rent-seeking results are relevant to government-business relationship.The relationship between large enterprises and government officials is closer to partnership,usually with a spokesperson in the federal government,which can influence federal-level decision-making to some extent,while the relationship between small business and officials is not that equal.This paper analyzes the mechanism and influence of Russian rent-seeking behaviors from different angles and draws the following conclusions.Rent is widely distributed in food,textile,machinery,transportation and other ilndustries.The price of rent-seeking has nothing to do with whether the company has a contract with the government and is related to the nature of the industry.Rent-seeking does not bring corresponding return to the enterprises.The sales growth rate in the past three years is significantly lower than the overall average growth rate of low government-capture countries,which is more obvious in the contrast of the counterpart of Russia's high government capture companies and low government capture companies.