Font Size: a A A

Evolution Of Chinese Rural Land Property Right

Posted on:2005-08-13Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H HuangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2166360155457836Subject:Political economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Approching the rearch of land institution change, we need to compare agricultural efficiency under diffierent property rights structure, while diffierent efficiency means potential profit. New profitable opportunities which are unreachable under current property right structure will induce people to create new form of property rights in order to internalize outside profit.However, people who research institution change of Chinese land always have the puzzle that when there is a central power the notion that autonomous activities on property rights innovation according to personal cost and income consideration is imperfect to interpret mass property rights change.The country donimates any mass property rights change including land property rights in China. Illumination which compulsory change theory gives us is that the ruler always supply inefficient property rights from his own preoccupation. Although the theory make up the defficiency of the enticing theory which is absent of a state, it is impotent as it is used to explain long-term tendency of land instituion change.This paper is based on such a reality that the income stagnance of peasents is derived from the inefficient collective land property rights. Although peasants can transform the collective land institution to private land institution so that they can get more profits, however, the transfromation cannot be realized under current institutional circumstance,which means the state is inclined to maintain the present land institution.Through introspecting historical change of land institution we advance a theoratical frame which premises a absolute ruler dominates a country consisted of a group of peasants. We try, then, to use this frame to analyze the evolution of land property right from faint and unprotected situation to explicit as well as being protected by self-enforced contract, and furthermore, may evolve to be pretected by thiry-party enforced machanism. On the other hand, how does the property rights stagnate and setback when major disruptions change the stipulated profit allocation of former agreement between ruler and peasants. Through the anlysis of historial and...
Keywords/Search Tags:Land property right, Institution change, Security, Wealth-Maximizing
PDF Full Text Request
Related items