Research On Principal-agent Mechanism In Supply Chain Collaboration

With the advancement of supply chain management (SCM) practicing in enterprises, we have recognized that a product's competition power is not determined by a company, but by the product's supply chain. Some enterprisers with strategic sight start to carry out supply chain management and logistics collaboration with partners look for approaches to lower the logistics cost and improve the standard of logistics service in order to meet the customers' requirements.So the core of SCM is how to realize the collaboration among supply chain members, but good collaboration lies in reasonable and effective collaborative mechanism. This thesis begins with the principal-agent problem caused by asymmetric information in supply chain collaboration (SCC), and then applies game theory and information economics methods to bring forward the principal-agent mechanism to solve the relevant problems in SCC. Moreover, it analyzes the principle of principal-agent mechanism in detail, and uses signaling theory and incentive mechanism to solve the adverse select and moral hazard problems respectively so as to come up with theoretic reasons and practical guidance for SCC. The enterprises in supply chain can apply principal-agent mechanism to solve the adverse select and moral hazard problems, so this thesis gives enterprises a approach or method to solve such problems in order to achieve "win-win" goal. At the same time, I investigated several corporations through practicing to get some detailed materials that makes me known the situations and problems in the SCC of our country's corporations, so I give a deep analysis on these based on principal-agent theory and put forward some countermeasures for companies.