Study On The Government Supervision And Incentive Mechanism Of Quality Behavior To Engineering Supervision Enterprise

With the constant increase of our country's infrastructure construction and Chinese entering WTO, there is an unprecedented opportunity to our engineering supervision enterprises. But at the same time, they bring challenges to the responsible department of the government and engineering supervision enterprise——System and model of engineering quality supervision organ, which formed and developed gradually in planned economy condition, can not adapt to demand of changing situation any more. "Quality management rule of the construction project ", which issued and implemented in 2000, is the direct embodiment of deepening system reform of the engineering quality surveillance and management in our country. Compare with the past project quality surveillance and management policy, one of new regulations' main characteristic demonstrates that it put emphasis on strengthening to supervise quality behavior of each main body participated in engineering construction. However, the implementation of our country's project construction supervisory system is later, various kinds of related policies and regulations are still imperfect, research and application of supervising quality behavior management don't deepen as well, and this has already influenced the quality of the construction project of our country and restricted management enterprise to participate in the international competition seriously. In general, the Principal-Agent theory considers that supervise and incentive having effect of substituting. Therefore, The text attempts to analyze supervision and management of supervision quality behavior with incentive theory, so as to break through and innovate the theory, and perfect theory on government's supervision and management of project quality, raise management level of supervising, strengthen the competitiveness of our country's supervision enterprises, meet the opportunities and challenges of present internationalized development. First of all, the text analyzed the definition of construction supervision enterprises' quality behavior and existing problem at the present stage, and applied game theory to analyze supervision and management of engineering quality supervisory organ to engineering supervision enterprises' quality behavior. Furthermore, the text found out the way of improving construction supervision enterprise's quality behavior, and carried on analyzing economically the supervisory organ of engineering quality at the same time, therefore drew the government who sets up incentive mechanism to supervise. Afterwards, to the question that the incentive mechanism is designed, after analyzing the relationship between responsible department of the government and engineering supervision enterprises, owner and engineering supervision enterprises, the text carried on the choice analysis of the government to engineering supervision enterprises' incentive mode, and put forward mechanism of setting up reputation incentive and it's condition. So far, combining owner to material incentive of engineering supervision enterprise formed the double incentive mechanism, it's very important to improve engineering enterprise's quality behavior, guarantee engineering quality, and raise investment benefits. The text lastly applied extension to engineering supervision quality behavior of comprehensive appraisal, set up a set of comprehensive evaluation index system of engineering supervision enterprise's quality behavior, at the same time, it applied extension comprehensive appraisal method to appraisal of some project construction supervision enterprise's quality behavior, its result indicates this kind of method is simple and effective, science and corresponding to reality.