The Capabilities Approach: Problems And Prospects

Up until now, we still do not have an adequate and fully satisfactory theory which enables us to address the pervasive and serious problems of human development and social justice that we face in this era of "globalization." I argue essentially that the capabilities approach, as articulated by Amartya Sen and further developed by Martha Nussbaum into a slightly different version, is a normatively strong and compelling proposal to that effect -esp. when compared with other competing theories, including those stemming from within "utilitarian welfare economics" and those more properly dubbed "resourcist," such as John Rawls' "justice as fairness." I do so not so much by carrying out a systematic and comprehensive comparison between all contending theories, but rather through a critical evaluation of the capabilities approach in an effort to bring out its comparative advantage intuitively, theoretically and practically. I show more specifically that this approach has a far more adequate informational basis than other theories, in that it includes considerations, neglected or excluded in one way or another by the latter, which are arguably crucial and most relevant for achieving human development, rather than merely economic growth, and ultimately social justice. After a brief discussion of the similarities and differences between Sen's version and Nussbaum's, I articulate a defense of the latter's attempt to remedy the incompleteness and deficiencies of the former and put forward a partial theory of global justice setting up minimal thresholds for "central combined capabilities" that governments around the world should strive to achieve for each and all of their citizens. Though admittedly controversial, Nussbaum's proposal constitutes, I contend, a bold and worthwhile step in the right direction. Next, I single out two of the most serious objections raised against the capabilities approach, namely, the comprehensive conception of the good objection (John Rawls) and the public criterion objection (Thomas Pogge), and I argue forcefully and hopefully convincingly that it can meet these objections. Finally, I conclude that, despite the challenges and problems that it still faces, the capabilities approach elicits bright and promising prospects for the kind of practical philosophy that is most desirable at this juncture of human history.