The Analysis Of Local Government Rent-seeking Behavior

In the marketing construction process, the local government plays an important role in China and becomes a vital endogenous variable in the local economic development and the national micro-economic development and stability. After the tax sharing and the fiscal decentralization reform, obtaining independent economic interest status, the local government increases its behavior among which a lot of variations appear. These variation behaviors hinder the development and improvement of the unified market severely and make the behaviors such as market segmentation, local protection, and local administrative monopoly increase in intensity. All of these become the research focus. With the research view of the behavior variation abundant in the local government behavior in China, combined with the rent-seeking theory research, the dissertation defines these behavior variations as"The local government rent-seeking behaviors"and analyzes its connotation. Based on the definition of local government rent-seeking behavior, according to actual situation in China, the horizontal rent-seeking creation, rent-seeking extraction as well as vertical rent-seeking forms and means of the local government rent-seeking behavior are generalized and the causes of the local government rent-seeking behaviors are also analyzed. After that, we do a deep research on the economic and social effect produced by the local government rent-seeking behaviors. Following it, we show that the local government rent-seeking behaviors don't always produce negative effects. Under certain systems, some forms of the local government rent-seeking behaviors can enhance the system progress and promote the system innovation, that is, produce positive effects. Finally, according to the research on local government rent-seeking behavior, we put forward that exactly understanding of the practical effect of local government rent-seeking behavior is important. Based on these researches, restrict some of the local government rent-seeking behavior is indispensable, while we also need to give enough room for institution innovation to local government.