The Game Analysis Of Illegal Coal-Mines In China

China is the country which have the largest production of coal in the world, and , at the same time, also have the poorest records of coal-mine safety. Information shows that , currently, the death rate of million-ton coal-mines in China is 4%, being 12 times of Russia, 30 times of South Africa, 100 times of USA. Recent year with the increasing of the demand of coal in domestic coal market, Accidents in coal-mines in turn occur more frequently, which deeply disturbs people all the time. One of the most important reasons of such tragedy, in my opinion, is the existence of illegal behavior of exploitation of illegal coal-mines. Therefore, it is fair emergent to administrate and fight against the illegal coal-mines. Why are on earth the illegal coal mines which have been obviously prohibited in the law still existing all over the country. From this point, this article analyze the correlations of all the behavior subjects involving into the illegal coal-mines , in order to find out the factors influencing their behaviors and attempt to put forwards some measures and suggestions on supervising the illegal coal-mines.The article is divided into five parts in all.The first part is introduction of the whole article . At first the article review the cases of studies on relevant or similar subject in the academic realm home and abroad, then expound the importance of studying this problem after introducing the premise and methods of studying. At last , the content summary and structure of the article are drew in orderto make readers quickly know what problem the article deal with .The second part mainly deal with how to define;the two terms: legal coal-mine and illegal coal-mine .Firstly the article discusses the two terms from the angle of national laws and regulations, then redefines two conception according to current situation .The third part can be distributed into three parts. The first part analyzes the situation and characterization of the illegal coal-mines in China. The second part mostly deals with the passive impact of illegal coal-mines, it involves :destructing the environments .wasting of resources, disturbing the equilibrium of coal market. The last part analyzes the reasons of. the existence of illegal coal-mines, which involves five facets: large profits, loose administration , poverty of country farmers, rising demand in the coal market , collusion between officials and coal-mine owners.The fourth part mainly analyze the relation of all relevant interests subjects involving the illegal coal-mines in the light of Game theory and actual situation through formulating several game models. This includes :the game analysis betweenthe main subjects-----such as coal miners , coal-mineowners ,and those who are responsible for exploiting coal-mines , the game analysis between coal-mine part and government supervision institutions, the game analysis between miners and government , the game analysis between latent illegal coal-mines accessor and legal coal-mines. Especiallythe game analysis between the part of coal-mine and government was further discussed the correlative factors which influence thebehavior of all subjects in coal-mines. So this may offer us a thinking direction to find out the solutions to the problems.In the fifth part , being on the basis of preceding chapter, a series off corresponding solutions and suggestions is put forward . These measures include: encouraging coal miners to fight against the illegal coal-mines ,strengthening the punishment to the owners who exploit the coal-mines illegally in short time and to the government officers who do not enforce the law grimly in the long time, lowering cost of government supervision , enforcing the country legislation , especially the criminal law. developing market economy , constructing the harmonious society, and so on .This article is the elementary research on the basis of studies by predecessors . If there is innovation , it lies that several research tools—such as game theory— are employed in the text, so as to analyze the game relations of the tripartiteinterests bodies ----- coal miners ,owners and governmentinvolving the illegal coal-mines exploitation. In addition, this article exclusively analyzes not only the game relation of between miners and government but also that of between miners and coal owners , at the same time , the author attempt to formulate game models to illustrate the hidden phenomenon of "officer-coal mine owner collusion" and the protectionism of local government for the illegal coal-mines , which is usefulto remedy the drawbacks of studies by predecessors . In the end , the author put forwards some good and characteristic suggestions in the light of discussion .