An Empirical Study Of Managerial Remaining In M&A In The Chinese Listed State-owned Companies

This paper investigates managerial remaining of the state corporate in Chinese listed companies during mergers and acquisitions .We put lines under a fact that the managers in order to hold the position in the corporation which can lead them to an reputed honor, they can decide the price of the trading shares .we find that the power of the managers depends on the characters of the corporate governance structure and the trade.The bidders want to gain positive margin and enhance their ability of competition in the product market by strategic mergers and acquisitions. If the investigations lead to a promising result, its costs must be economized in addition to the intergradations. So the price of the trading shares is very important to the bidders during the negotiation with the managers of the target companies. In the negotiation of the state-owned corporate, the main objects contacting is the high–class managers in the target firm. The managers have a good opportunity coming to an agreement with the bidder firm to hold the position and the other wealth under a poor condition of supervising, which harm the interesting of the state wealth.This paper describes the course of the alienation of the state-owned listed companies, point the possibility and the way of the self-satisfied of the managers by lowering the price of the share to trade for a continuous managerial career, which low the threshold of the embezzling by the controlling shareholder. We chose 18 indexes including managerial power dimensionality, managerial independence dimensionality, managerial credit dimensionality and trade character dimensionality to describe the influenced price agreed by both sides.