Research Of China Coal Mine Safety Regulations Failure

Not only mine safety is closely connected with the miners’ safety and health, butalso related to the sustainable economic growth and social development of the country,related to the realization of a harmonious socialist society goal. During the coal minesafety production, the relationship among government, mining companies, miners,these major stakeholders are very complex and interlaced with each other, due todifferent reasons, it is difficult to achieve the balance of all relevant parties throughnegotiation, leading to the imbalances and frequent mining accidents, whichhighlights the failure of China’s coal mine safety regulation issues. Coal mine safetyregulation can be regarded as a contractual arrangement between the government andthe coal mining enterprises, this paper focus on the agreement between the localgovernment and the coal companies to build the appropriate game model to analyzeand explore, to study the reason why coal mine safety regulation has so manyproblems, and identify the problems and propose appropriate countermeasures andsuggestions.This paper is divided into five parts, the basic idea is to build an appropriatemodel to analyze the game to explore, to analyze the evolution of such arrangementsand transaction costs through the use of contract between local governments and coalmining enterprises to reach contractual arrangements, to lead to the further incentivemechanism to mobilize the initiative of each subject, thereby improving coal minesafety regulations target effect, ultimately reveal the reasons for the failure of China’scoal mine safety regulations as well as the institutional defects and to make policyrecommendations.The first part is an introduction of the research background, significance,method, and the innovation.The second part is the summary of domestic and foreign literature review,research status of domestic and foreign scholars on aspects of coal mine safetyregulations were reviewed and summarized classification.The third part analyzes the development process of Chinese coal mine safetyregulation and the performance regulatory of failure, with the development of Chinese coal mine safety regulations introduced, and then from the regulatory agencies and theregulatory approach to the Chinese coal mine safety regulations were elaborated,using specific data to analyze the failure of coal mine safety regulation performance.The fourth part found inconsistent "incentive paradox" based on policies andobjectives, based on the local government in the construction of the coal miningenterprise game model between coal mining enterprises and basic game model, andhow to solve this paradox to analyze the cause of failure of Chinese coal mine safetyregulations.The fifth part make policy advises to solve the problems of Chinese coal minesafety regulations failure. It is suggested that by deepening the reform of theregulatory institutions and management system, we should effectively transformgovernment functions, enhance the independence of regulatory agencies, carry out theaccountability system, and strengthen the transparency of the government regulation.We can introduce incentives to improve the coal mine safety regulation methods.Develop the supervisory role of the masses and the media to create a favorableexternal environment for coal mine safety regulations.Paper will use the game model solving other issues to apply to the analysis ofcoal mine safety regulation issues, and to find some new perspectives on coal minesafety regulations failure reasons, to address and identify appropriate countermeasuresand solutions for coal mine safety regulations, which are designed to provide a newperspective.