Research On Game Of Vertical Independent And Joint Emission Reduction In Supply Chain With Emission Tax

Nowadays carbon tax has been widely adopted by the international society as apolicy tool to control carbon emissions. Based on the externality theory and pigoviantax, carbon tax can effectively encourage enterprises to reduce carbon emissions. Inthe background of carbon tax, the cost structure will change and games in a supplychain will add the emission-reduction part. As low carbon economy is increasinglymature and consumer environmental protection consciousness gradually increases,consumers will present low carbon product preference. This dissertation studied thegame about independent emission-reduction and joint emission-reduction betweenupstream and downstream enterprises in a supply chain.Firstly, under the background of carbon tax and consumer low-carbon preference,this dissertation studied the carbon tax effect on enterprise’s actions directed atenterprises both with and without emission-reduction ability. The result showed thatfor enterprise without emission-reduction ability, both production quantity and profitwould decrease, carbon tax would take effect in emission control with the expense ofloss in enterprise’s profit. Carbon emissions per unit of output cannot be reduced.Enterprise with emission-reduction ability can improve both production quantity andprofit by taking emission reduction actions.Secondly, this dissertation studied vertical independent emission reduction gamein a supply chain. Game equilibrium showed that both supplier and manufacturewould take emission-reduction strategy. Feasible emission-reduction interval existsand the optimal emission-reduction quantity per unit can be obtained. Numericalexperiment was used to analyze the influence of carbon tax on product quantity, profit,level of emission-reduction investment.Finally, vertical joint emission-reduction mechanism was designed inside supplychain for enterprise without emission-reduction ability, which can on the one hand,promote the optimized allocation of resources, on the other hand improve the overalllevel of emission-reduction in a supply chain. Game equilibrium solution wasobtained including optimal proportion of cost sharing, optimal allowance price perunit, optimal production and optimal emission-reduction quantity per unit. Numericalexperiments were adopted to verify the effectiveness of the joint mechanism.