Research On The Conflict Equilibrium Between The Emission Reduction And The Income Of The Main Manufacturer Supplier Considering The Carbon Emission Transfer

Under the macro carbon emission reduction policy,the main body of the supply chain adopts the way of negative production and transfer cost,which makes the carbon emission reduction policy difficult to implement and also reduces the overall efficiency of the supply chain.Under the assumption of rational person,when exogenous macro carbon planning is used in micro emission reduction main enterprises,micro enterprises with typical rational person characteristics will pursue their own interests to maximize their emission reduction goals,and it is often the best choice to transfer the carbon emission reduction they should undertake to other enterprises upstream and downstream of the supply chain.This kind of independent enterprise behavior will not only break the initial equilibrium of its supply chain,but also make it difficult to maximize the economic and emission reduction benefits of the whole supply chain,and finally form multiple conflicts between the enterprises in the supply chain and the overall profit objectives and emission reduction objectives of the supply chain.Under the background of macro carbon regulation,this paper aims at the problem of carbon emission transfer in the "main manufacturer supplier" supply chain system under the super conflict of emission reduction and benefits.First,based on the conflict analysis graph model,we test and analyze the super conflict equilibrium of the supply chain,and prove that the super conflict equilibrium exists in the supply chain.By building the conflict analysis diagram model of manufacturers and suppliers,the paper makes strategic assumptions on the carbon emission transfer strategy of manufacturers and suppliers,finds out the feasible state,and obtains the preference information of manufacturers and suppliers through the state transfer diagram.According to the preference statement information of manufacturers and suppliers,the state preference sequence of manufacturers and suppliers can be obtained by using the strategy priority ranking method,and then the equilibrium analysis of emission reduction and income conflict based on carbon emission transfer in different situations.Based on the differential game theory,Nash equilibrium theory and stasberg game,this paper constructs a differential game model of the secondary supply chain of manufacturers and suppliers,analyzes the balance of emission reduction and conflict of interest in non cooperative and cooperative situations,and analyzes the impact on emission reduction in different situations by comparing the carbon emission trajectory and profit trajectory.Based on the Nash equilibrium analysis and stasberg game Grid game analysis builds a "super conflict equilibrium" game model to solve the balance point of emission reduction and profit of the whole supply chain,as well as the reasonable distribution of benefits.Then,based on the application program of MATLAB,the paper makes a numerical simulation analysis of the super conflict equilibrium model,combining with the specific trading scenarios of supply chain enterprises,and makes an analysis of emission reduction and income balance.The results show that: 1)the level of carbon emission transfer undertaking depends on the marginal profit of the supplier,the impact of the level of carbon emission transfer undertaking on the market demand and the cost of carbon emission transfer undertaking,and the supplier's undertaking behavior has a positive impact on the market demand;2)no matter what kind of decision-making mode,the manufacturer's carbon emission transfer level and the level of emission reduction technology research and development are determined by And the R &D level of emission reduction technology of suppliers is positively related to consumers' low-carbon preferences,while the carbon emission undertaking level of suppliers is not affected by consumers' low-carbon preferences;3)although the super conflict equilibrium between manufacturers and suppliers can maximize the overall profits of the supply chain,the government must increase the incentive mechanism to further promote low-carbon consumption if both sides want to participate in it voluntarily,Improve consumers' low-carbon awareness,and provide technical support to relevant enterprises;supply chain enterprises need to improve their technical level as soon as possible,and reduce their dependence on carbon emission transfer.