Research On The Risk Of Individual Housing Loans Of China

In the current single housing finance system in which bank is the main vector, as relatively high quality assets, individual housing mortgage loans achieved rapid development, but the problems and risks are gradually exposed, The increasing non-performing loan rate and the expansion amount, caused concerns of banks and other communities. Preventing financial risks in the area of individual housing loans should not be overlooked, because it's very important to preserve our financial stability. In drawing on the basis of foreign scholars, domestic scholars had studied it from many different perspectives, but empirical research is obviously insufficient.The actual operation of the bank is also accounted for the experience to judge. Read through a lot of literature and data collection, we found that due to the backward establishment of a loan-to-business database and the lack of personal credit information system and other issues, so far, empirical research about risks associated with individual housing loans is still restricted because that data collection and data availability problems are still exist as the shackles of imprisonment in this research. Because of these limitations, we attempts to find other ways to study this problem, game theory is just one of them, and we try to explain from the following aspects: combing through the involved loan business parties, starting from the session participants, we try to find the possible interactive behavior between stakeholders, analyze the root causes of the major risk :(1) loan business in the real estate market has never been a stand-alone. Price changes caused by the supply-demand change and the behavior of real estate speculation, hot money inflows, etc, have a direct impact on central government policies on individual housing loans. The stakeholders'implement influence the effect of policy in turn. All of these relate to the risk of individual housing loan market.(2) The game between directly involved participants infect the real estate market risks even more directly; There are reverse selection and moral hazard between banks - borrower's; The bank itself has the of imperfect process design and operational risks arising from insiders; The bank - the developer-the borrower will bring b "fake mortgage" risk. After the sort, we make the research of the problem fully and clearly, and finally we put forward the corresponding prevention ideas for all types of risk above.