Research On Coordinating Contracts For Fresh Agricultural Products Retailer And Logistics Service Provider

With the development of the social economy, people's living standard is improving and the demand for fresh agricultural products is also growing. However, in the circulation process of the domestic fresh agricultural products, the logistics facilities and equipments are obsolete, the logistics operation management is poor and the existing logistics contract incentive mechanism is not perfect, which make the logistics cost of the fresh agricultural products keep high and simultaneously make the loss be great. In view of that, this paper will begin with the logistics contract between retailer and the logistics service provider in the circulation process of fresh agricultural products, and research the effect that the decision-making action of the logistics service provider makes on the profile level of itself and retailer and the freshness level of product.Firstly, the relevant basic concepts are stated, the principal-agent theory that is used in designing the logistics contract is introduced, and the deteriorating inventory theory that is referenced in the inventory control process of fresh agricultural products is summarized.Secondly, aiming at the question that the effort level of the logistics service provider to keep the fresh agricultural product to be fresh would impact the sales volume and the product price, the several profit level and systematic profit level between retailer and the logistics service provider in the two modes of decentralized decisions and centralized decisions are analyzed. By comparing the two profit level, it is found that the profit level in centralized decisions is higher than that in decentralized decisions; the freshness of product in centralized decisions is higher than that in decentralized decisions; the retailer could sell goods with lower price in centralized decisions and obtain more market share. Then a cost and revenue sharing models is designed to coordinate the profit distribution problem between retailer and the logistics service provider.Thirdly, aiming at the problem that how to design effective logistics contract to optimize both the profit level of retailer and the cost of the logistics service provider under the condition that the freshness effort level the logistics service provider provides is unobservable. Using the principal-agent theory, a linear contract is designed and the effect that several parameters make on the freshness effort level of the logistics service provider is analyzed. The conclusion shows that this contract can coordinate their profit level effectively.Finally, the effect that the freshness effort level of the logistics service provider makes on the ordering policy of retailer is analyzed. The ordering policy of retailer and the freshness effort level of the logistics service provider are comparing in two modes of decentralized decisions and centralized decisions. By analyzing the calculating example, it is found that the systematic profit level in centralized decisions is evidently higher than that in decentralized decisions; the freshness level of the fresh agricultural product in centralized decisions is higher than that in decentralized decisions; and both benefits can be effectively coordinated by using the revenue sharing contract.