Research On Regulation Of China's Building Energy Efficiency

Since the world's energy crisis in 70s in the 20th century, many countries has begun to attach great importance to energy conservation issues.Energy reservation and energy efficiency has become a crucial issue to the healthy economical development of China.In building industry, as the largest energy consumption, building energy efficiency has become the popular issue that has been studied in many countries, for example, the United States and Europe have put the field of building energy efficiency research into the field of economic research and made a specific classification on the building energy efficiency market, and proposed some govenrnement regulations on the building energy efficiency. The present study, on the basis of building energy efficiency market segmentation, has conducted an analysis of market power and found that the building energy efficiency market possesses the monopoly power on the part of the buyer. In the study of asymmetric information, the Game interest model of asymmetric information between the energy parts manufacturers and the developers has been established, which in turn found that a consumer class of developers prefer consuming energy inefficient parts. And in the external economy, it has been found that the positive external economy generated by the building energy efficiency will not result in the Pareto Optimal of the energy. These problems have made the building energy efficiency market fail to efficiently allocate the energy. In order to solve the energy allocating problems caused by the market failure, the government regulation has been introduced. In the building energy conservation, the government mainly can regulate the monopoly power of the buyer, asymmetric information, and the positive external economics. As to the first two issues, the government mainly adopts price regulation theory to provide price subsidies and tax incentives to the energy-saving parts manufacturers. As to information asymmetry issue, the present study has proposed that the government should establish a platform to show signals with a purpose of letting the consumers have a more clear understanding on the prices of the products. Since the government regulation exists in the form of administrative department of building energy conservation, it is possible for the department to rent and consequently, the manufacturers in the building energy market can have the chance to seek the rent. In such circumstances, re-regulation of government is needed. By establishing a triplet rent-seeking game model of the government, the administrative department and the energy-saving parts manufacturers or the developers, the government incentive regulation and regulation relaxation have been proposed in order to realize re-regulation.