The Study Of Mechanism Design On Lead-investor From Star-up Enterprise's Crowdfunding Financing

Under the background of supply-side reform,technology-oriented and platform-based relying on the development of the Internet have played a huge help for the transformation-upgrading and promotion of China's economy.The role of start-up companies in China's economic development is more and more important.But in real life,small and medium-sized start-ups can not get support from banks whose main business is indirect financing model.Most of the start-up companies can't last long due to lack of enough funds.The rapid development and application of the Internet is to subvert the traditional financial industry,the emerging model of "Internet&Finance" is going to provide a support solving the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises.As a new model in the field of internet finance,the equity crowd-funding model provides an effective way for the small and medium-sized start-up enterprises to directly and easily solve the financing problems and reduce the enterprise leverage by way of direct financing.However,the development of equity crowd-funding in China is not as good as foreign country because of low domestic trust,information asymmetry,the majority of ordinary investors and other reasons.The research object of this paper is the innovation of leader-investor institution in the process of venture capital investment,which focuses on the establishment of bilateral market paradigm by introducing lead as an intermediary.On the basis of the deep analysis of the problems such as improving the market efficiency,promoting the cooperation and avoiding the risk of the investment and financing as well as the moral hazard from lead-investor,this paper puts forward some advice and suggestions for the problem of adverse selection,moral hazard,prisoner's dilemma and other difficult countermeasures.This paper introduces the concept of lead-investor and analyzes its role,provides the mathematical proof for the promotion of efficiency through the signal transmission model and get the empirical data support.In this paper,the research on the lead-investor through the pre-investment and post-invsetment.In the pre-stage,paper focuses on the analysis of the traditional co-invest model based on adverse selection due to the information asymmetric basis and the loss of efficiency.What's more,paper puts forward a number of recommendations about the standardization of information.In the post-stage,this article draws on the experience of the traditional independent director system,focusing on the lead-investor's function to supervise executive director and protect small and medium-sized investors.At the same time,this paper also considers the existence of lead-investor's moral hazard due to the asymmetry of the information between lead-investor and followers.This paper finds the cause of the moral hazard by use of the evolutionary game model and puts forward the design of the mechanism through the incentive and restraint mechanism and other measures,as far as possible to show the advantage of lead-investor,at the same time to prevent the risk of moral hazard.This paper has great practical significance to improve the efficiency of the capital market of our country.