Comparison And Selection Of The Environmental Policy Method:Thinking Based On The Interaction Between Stakeholders

Haze has appeared in several regions in China since 2013, such as Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta. Haze not only influences the vision of the travelling people and vehicles, but also leads to respiratory disease and cardiovascular disease, which are harm to people’s health and damages the ecosystem. The spread of haze makes the environmental problem become the heated issue in the whole country. However, haze is just the tip of the iceberg since more environmental problems are spreading throughout the country.The environmental policy method under the condition of socialist market economy should follow the market rule. The economic-stimulated policy would do more in the future’s environmental management. This paper introduces the development of environmental policy method, the theory of property right and entrusted agency and their relationship, which provide the theoretical basis for the analysis of the efficiency of the environmental economic policy. Based on the model of property right by Barzel, the author analyzes the influence of right of residual claim and supervision costs resulting from resulting pollutant emissions from the government and enterprises on the efficiency of environmental policy method emphatically. The government and public have a entrusted agency relationship. The author discusses the relationship between risk-taking and right of residual claim with the basic model of entrusted agency. By the analysis of two models, it is indicated that the efficiency of environmental policy method depends on the influence of enterprises and government on reduction, the difficulty degree of mutual supervision and the risk. The party with bigger influence, more difficult supervision and more risk should get the rights of residual claim of reduction.Under the environment of socialist market economy, the government always occupies the dominant position, so it should get more rights of residual claim on environmental protection. Enterprises are the important factor in the market. With the deepening of marketization, enterprises will make more contributions, and the effect and governmental supervision should also be improved. Therefore, during the reciprocal process of marketization and planization, emission caps, emmision fee and tradable emission right achieve the highest efficiency. In China, environmental capacity is owned by everyone, but people would fall into the problem of " hitchhiking ", causing the dilemma of collective action. The central government always represents the interests of the majority and exerts power on behalf of the people. However, except administered by the central government to maintain the interests of the people, different government sectors also consider their own interests at the same time. Considering the interaction between government sector and the public, our analysis shows that when there is information asymmetry, the efforts of government sector will deviate from the pareto optimal level. If the administrative effect is irrelevant with government revenue, the government will lack work enthusiasm. Certain risk for government sector could improve administrative efficiency.Either from the relationship between enterprise and government, or from that between government sector and public relations, emission fee and environmental tax should become the subject of environmental economic means in China’s current economic system framework. Emission caps and tradable emission right should play the proper role in specific areas.