Rural Non-reflux Labor Transfer

Based on the fact of rural surplus labor force transfer in China, the author discusses the question of non-return of rural surplus labor force transfer. Consulting the existed classified methods of rural surplus labor force and my understanding of circumfluence and non-return labor force, this article divides rural surplus labor force into two parts, which are native non-return rural surplus labor force and allochthonous non-return rural surplus labor force. Analyze the factors which affect the transfer of these two parts of rural surplus labor force respectively. Because of system variance in China has the color of government leading, so exploding the system impediment in rural surplus labor force transfer without the help of government. This article looks the government and non-return rural surplus labor force as two sides of the game matrix from the view of government.With the game model and the more analysis, the game between the government and non-return rural surplus labor force is a multiple game, which is to say that in the process of allochthonous non-return rural surplus labor force transfer, the two sides watch tactics each other to reach the result of Nash equilibrium. When the policy comes into existence, the government should reference the transfer behaviors of allochthonous non-return rural surplus labor force. In the game of the government and native non-return rural surplus labor force, it can achieve the single result of Nash equilibrium in the case of the two side action at the same time. But because the costs of native rural surplus labor force circumfluence are very low, the government should calculates the probability of the non-return of native rural surplus labor force by researching material. After compared the probability and the critical probability, the government can choose the appropriate policy mix to promote the non-return of native rural surplus labor force.