The Early Cold War U.s. Policy ,1947-1950

After World War II , America launched a grand strategy designed t? compete for the world leadership with the Soviet Union. Policy toward China was based on this grand strategy. But from the beginning, this stratgy and domestic politics jointly determined the administration?s self ?contradictory attitude toward China policy. In early 1947, from the straight forward strategic perspective, a policy of disengagement from China was adopted for a short time. For guaranteeing the smoothly implementing of the Europe ?centered and expensive grand strategy, and under the domestic political pressure, American policy ?makers put the Ch~ina policy on the anticommunist track. Therefore, from May 1947, a policy of limited assistance was adopted. This policy essentially is a policy of supporting Chiang Kai - shek against the Chinese Communist Party. From spring 1949, for the purpoe of promoting division between the Soviet Union and Communist China, a Wedge strategy, which backfired in practice, was formed in NSC?34/2 and NSC?41. In order to achieve the same goal, from late 1949 to early 1950, a policy of preparing to recognize new China and giving up Taiwan was basically established by the Truman Administration. Howerver at this critical stage America抯 strategic thinking was becoming more inflexible and tougher and domestically political atmosphere increasingly poisonous, which made the pursuance of a realistic China policy all the more impracticable. It?s the vacillation of the Truman Administration that made it ?? sayander chances for improved bilateral relations between the United States and CCP~ Confrontation was thus made and persisted for more than two decades. This paper deems that the grand strategy and domestic politics were two basic major factors that jointly determinded the America?s China policy. The smooth pursuance of this grand strategy depended on the domestic support because of its nature of great expenditure and anti ?traditionalism. The administration always saw China policy through the prism of competing for the world leadership with the Soviet Union and, to a most extent, treated it as a chip to secure public support for its grand strategy. Congress representatives, including the China bloc, and China Lobby took this advantage, advocating supporting Chiang Kai ?shek againist CCP just for their own interests. The general public were muddled by the manipulated rhetoric and couldn?t understand clearly the reality of Chinese problem. All of the above made necessarily supporting Chiang against CCP the principal aspect of this period?s American policy toward China, which eventually crystallized into nonrecognition.