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Optimization Theory And Methods In Business Action

Posted on:2004-08-02Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H S LvFull Text:PDF
GTID:2206360092992514Subject:Applied Mathematics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
This thesis mainly investigates the incentive and restrictive mechanism of supply and sales agency under the uncertain demands of product. When retailer adopts the strategy of flexible order, manufacturer must decide his optimal decision-making of production based on the uncertainty of future demands. And the manufacturer should introduce default penalty in order to constrain the behavior of retailer, and then a calculating formula of default penalty is presented between one manufacturer and one retailer for the first time in this thesis. What's more, the situation of one manufacturer and two retailers is also introduced. With the increase of the manufacturer and retailer's quantity, the transaction relationship will be very intricate. This thesis solves the problem by adopting the knowledge of network flows.The main content and achievement of this thesis are the following:In Chapter 1, the origin of idea of this paper and work of other scholar are introduced.In Chapter 2, through comparing with price constraint mechanism and fault punishment constraint mechanism, the thesis indicates that the price constraint doesn't play a role in constraining the behavior of retailer' flexible order. On the contrary, making use of default penalty can form the win-win situation.In Chapter 3, the thesis designs the transaction mechanism by stages. That is to say, one contract is carried out in two stages of one valid period. Comparing to the fault punishment constraint mechanism, the transaction mechanism by stages makes the optimal order quantity of supply and sales agency increase.in Chapter 4, the thesis does some research on transaction mechanism of price discount. Based on the transaction mechanism, manufacturer can influence the order quantity of retailer according to regulating the fault penalty.In Chapter 5, the thesis discusses the situation of lack of retailer's order in one valid period of contract. Retailer will increase the order quantity in the next period. Correspondingly, manufacturer will increase default penalty.In Chapter 6, the thesis introduces the transaction mechanism of return, and indicates that the appropriate price of return can make supply and sales agency be satisfied.In Chapter 7, the thesis discusses the relationship of one manufacturer and two retailers from three respects, and gives the optimal quantity of production and demand according to an example.In Chapter 8, the thesis lays stress on application, and solves the problem of goods distribution by using the knowledge of network flows.
Keywords/Search Tags:flexible order, default penalty, transaction mechanism, supply chain, network flows
PDF Full Text Request
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