Information On Product Pricing Based On Consumer Utility Analysis

Information goods' characteristics decide its price is synthetically based on the consumers' utility and the firm's monopoly ability, none occupies the predominant position. Again, a most obvious characteristic of information goods is that its fixed cost is very high but its reproduction cost is very low, which make little sense of information goods pricing on base of cost. But price discrimination based on the information goods' value displays its own advantages. Price discrimination that is widely used by monopolists has been certified its effectiveness. But on the other hand, many scholars have shown that price discrimination on information goods is invalid under certain circumstances, All these studies show that monopolists should be very careful when using price discrimination, So this paper analyses the information goods firm how to concretely use price discrimination.According to information goods' characteristics and the domestic and international related studies' present condition, This paper relatively deeply analyses several typical kinds of price discrimination of information goods firms in our country, gets the price discrimination's condition, and points out the firms' specific practical measures. The distinct distinguishes between the paper and the related studies are that this paper uses nonlinear utility function and assumes the marginal cost of reproduction is zero.This paper includes seven chapters, and its concrete content is as follows:The first chapter gives a definite definition to information goods, points out the information goods' most obvious characteristics and the factors that affect the price. Analyses the domestic and international related studies' present condition, then puts forward the study way of this paper.The second chapter applies economics model to analyses the incentive of information goods' versioning and the set of self-select mechanism, then analyses the principle, basis and quantities in view of marketing.The third chapter analyses the quality discrimination based on consumers' endogenous and exogenous characteristic, when the firm only supplies two versions.The fourth chapter analyses the condition of second-degree price discrimination, with the firm's using two constraints conditions, when the firm knows that consumers' taste parameter is uniformly distributed.The fifth chapter analyses the condition of price discrimination, with the firm's using two constraints conditions, when the firm doesn't know how the consumers' taste parameter is distributed, but it knows the taste parameter's probability distribution function and the corresponding density function.The sixth chapter analyses the firm's condition of bundling selling better than not bundling selling and the firm's price discrimination, when the information goods is bundling sold.The sixth chapter comes to a conclusion of the paper, points out the study meaning and the drawbacks, and then gives an outlook of the related researches.