The relationship between the central government and the local governments is a hot topic in politics. This paper aims to analyze their zero game relationship by explaining a conspicuous phenomenon in the politics of China that the higher authorities have policies and the localities have countermeasures. After introducing the attempts of Chinese leaders to readjust the relationship between central and local governments since 1978, the author points out the drawbacks in the current relationship, including the phenomenon that the higher authorities have policies and the localities have their countermeasures. Then, by making a deeper analysis of the phenomenon with an example, the author explains the reasons leading to the countermeasures of local governments: the root cause is the local governments'focus on their interests, and the more important cause for current China is the shortcomings of political institutions. To cope with the problem, the author finally puts forward constructive ways as follows: the recognition of the local governments'interests to regulate the relationship, the enhancement of the central authority, decentralization by improving the constitution and laws, the improvement of communication channel, and the establishment of the expression institution. In that way, the relationship between the central government and the local governments can be a positive non-zero sum game, which will help make a harmonious society in China. |