Maximum. Public Service Motivation: Case Study On The Incentives Of Elected Neighborhood Committee Cadres In Shanghai

Urban residents' committee (RC) election through which the legitimacy source of committee members has been reconfigured represents a major political development in urban China. It remains a key challenge for local government to design a new model of incentive system so that these election-based committee cadres can generate necessary public spirits and enthusiasm in both self-governing affairs and also public services delivery, despite that they have various realistic motivations in their positions. Such an incentive system matters not only for sustainable development of urban grassroots democracy, but also for consolidation of grassroots regime and elaboration of social worker management system. Base on general theories of incentive structure in governance, this paper explores a new pattern of incentive system in which election-based RC cadres can be behaviorally driven with public-oriented motivation. Case analysis in Shanghai illustrates current problems and dilemmas in self-governance incentives, upon which we envision the goal orientation and the corresponding institutional and mechanical arrangements.