Supply Chain Information Sharing

The competition between corporations has evolved into the competition between supply chains with the economical globalization and the intensification of market competition. Information is the solid base for Supply Chain Management (SCM), because it offers a fundamental reference which help managers of a supply chain decide and establish a uniform concordant and concerted supply chain through close linking with drive factors of a supply chain. If realization of real-time effective information sharing during enterprises on a supply chain makes enterprise's operation gain synchronization and consistency, there may be most efficiency and least cost in supply chain system and goals of SCM are realized. Therefore abundant information sharing is a successful key on SCM.The value and incentive mechanism of information sharing in a supply chain are mainly studied. First it discusses great contents, characters of information sharing on a supply chain. Second linking with importance of information sharing it studies that sharing demand information favors information receiver or sender different value through a optimal mathematic model. We find that information sharing among supply chain members may help improve supply chain performance, but the benefits contributing to information receiver or sender lies most difference. Information receivers may gain more benefit but information senders only gain less benefit or may damage benefit of own from information sharing. So this information sharing mechanism must be compelling and transaction-based among supply chain members. Finally it researches how to for information receivers strengthen incentives and monitoring to the effort level of information sharing of information senders through a two task principal-agent model, and there gain corresponding optimization condition and influencing factors .Then the paper farther studies how the information receivers provide a incentive to the information senders so as in his interest to truthfully reveal own private precise market information and accordingly designs a optimal contract employing a mixed model of adverse selection before moral hazard. It is possible to...