In the last few years China's administrative official corruption cases have frequently occurred and the investigated corruptive officials with involved illegal funds have increased year by year. Although serious punishing movements were adopted to deal with official corruption, little effect was achieved. Consequently, I view our country's corruption restriction system is malfunction generally.From the sociological angle of view, the thesis aims at above-mentioned questions, and analyses the relationship between the hidden rules which are in vogue in society and our country's administrative official corruption. Meanwhile we attempt to infer the social reasons of our country's administrative official corruption, as well as the role and concrete function of hidden rules in the transaction of administrative official corruption. The profound analysis of the relationship between the hidden rules and our country's administrative official corruption can offer some social reference and theoretical basis for our country and related organization to effectively alleviate the executive official corruption, thus make contributions to our country's political reform and social management.The thesis, first, based on the news data, introduces the situation of our country's administrative official corruption. Then questions were put forward. When the problem of corruption of administrative officials was serious in history, hidden rules were on prevalence too. Was this a coincidence. What was the relationship between the administrative official corruption and the hidden rules. Then a detailed literature review defines the related theories and concepts. Based on the definition of sociologist Wu Si, hidden rules are hidden, away from rational rules, recognized in private between the two sides and beneficial or less loss to both sides. Then some citations from famous sociologist Li Xiang about hidden rules are referenced, which includes the social reasons of hidden rules and four categories of social groups from the view of hidden rules. Subsequently it simply describes rational rules, exchange theory and "Field-Habitus" theory, and the definition, content and scope of administrative officials.Secondly, with the reference of the definition of hidden rules and relevant theories and exchange theory, the thesis analyzes the trading process using hidden rules between the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber. For example, there are the cases of sending a red envelope and expensive gifts. It sums up that the reason why the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber adopt hidden rules is that through it both the administrative officials and briber can meet the so-called rational need, that is, more benefits or less loss than what they get in the open rules. Meanwhile hidden rules give the temptation of interests and relative authority in the process of corruption to the administrative officials, which also guarantee the obtaining of interests in the process of corruption. Through the hidden rules the administrative officials who are corruptive take shelter. With the establishment and expansion of corruption circles, the punishment from illegal behaviors and the risk of trading failure are less and the degrees of recognition of hidden rules are rising. Then the mutual promoting and support and mutual symbiotic relationships are demonstrated between hidden rules and administrative official corruption.Then with the "field-habitus" theory by French sociologist Bourdieu and the analysis of second-hand material, the subjective and objective factors are showed in the trading process using hidden rules between the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber. The subjective factors include the thought of pursuit of profits, following the others, luck and so on. The objective factors cover the interests of resources, the environment, and political power and so on. Just as the "field-habitus" theory by French sociologist Bourdieu, the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber are subjective to respective subjective and objective factors and commit some irregular exchange behaviors. Although the subjective and objective factors, does not necessarily result in the trading process using hidden rules between the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber, the degrees of recognition of hidden rules are rising between both sides, which will be one of the conditions of producing the trading process using hidden rules between the administrative officials who are corruptive and the briber.Last but not least, the following state conditions are listed in the thesis:the over-power of the administrative officials, the opacity of the process of administrative official's policy-making, the lack of cognition of open rules of four major social groups and the weakness of social supervision power, which provide the certain conditions that the administrative officials make the most of the hidden rules and the policy of restricting the corruption of the administrative officials is out of order. The suggestions are proper restricting of the power of the administrative officials, more transparency of the process of administrative official's policy-making, more cognition of open rules of four major social groups and more power and independency of the social supervision power. Those can directly or indirectly prevent the corruption trading of hidden rules from occurring and prevailing so that the purpose of limiting the administrative officials' corruption is achieved. |