Global Climate Governance In The Collective Action Problems

The aggravation of climate change lias exerted an increasing iDlfucnce upon (hedevelopment of human society. As the climate control involves the pitrticipalion of oil thecountries and will bring out a puer c\nd healthy citmospheric envirt>nment beneficial to (hewhole world, some country^due to the insignificance of their individual power in thisclimate control endeavor, are inclined to take an opportunistic Littitude, and thus take i\free ride to escape the high cost for climate control under the current inteniationliIcoinmiinity void of coercive measures and incenti“ve procedures. This free irding，，behavior becomes, ihe crux of the climate control；, t!iit5i the primary cause tbr thedifficulty of a collective action for global clsniLite control. Under the curernt intenititionalconditions, people all wander whether it is possible for an m.LernatiQiia.1collective actionbe successful and how to make [he action efefctive? This is what the paper is to answerGiven the fact that the global climate control hits thus far not seen a reasonable goaland an efficient action, ihe paper takej； the Copenhagen Climate Conftsrence as the objectof research, in. an attempt io elucidate the practical problem、and interests of allparticipants in the Conference. Despite the fact that ihe core ol’ ihe inlemcitiDiiii] politicshas shifted from the Iraditional security to the noniradiiional security, including climatecontrol, competition for national interests and political dominance over the wortd is stiltthe key issue in the international co mm unity. Therefore, all the participating ctJiintries,due to their unequal economk development and the coordination of capital andtechnology, or different interests in climate control, may have divergenl opinions a aidconflicting interests, thus making the Conference see no practical iiclrievemeriLIn a highly-dependent inlernational community lacking a cemtml authoriiy, as somecountry may not take their due responsibility in the g]oba] climate control, or even showno interest at all, the establishment of international institution makes this dependencere I at ions go predictably and contmllably’ and can decrease the cost of transaction andmake the international cooperation possible. Hence,, the establishnient of an iiiternatkmalinstitution is a good way to tackle with the problem of collective action in inlerniitionalcooperation. Beginning with thi、and based on the cooperation th’eory, OI sens sekcliveincentives and small grt)up performance theory, the paper sets out to explore the ways tosolve the predicament of collective action in global climate control.