Game Analysis On Financial Supervision In International Financial Crisis

There are various reasons for financial crisis, among which the main reason is the lack offinancial supervision. The standard development of financial market is the result of a long-termrepeated game between financial market supervisors and market participants. Therefore, marketsupervisors need to keep real-time dynamic supervision on market participants and give heavypunishment to illegal activities. The introduction part of this paper first expounds the backgroundand significance of paper topic, analyze the current research of this topic at home and abroad,and introduce the content of this paper. The second chapter then reviews the historicaldevelopment of Game Theory, and introduces traditional game and evolutionary gamerespectively by the classic “Prisoners’ Dilemma” and “Eagle-pigeons Game”. In the third chapter,We establish an complete information static game model between financial market supervisorsand market participants, analyze game countermeasures of both market supervisors and marketparticipants based on Nash equilibrium, give the sensitivity analysis, obtain impact of each factorexisted in game model on game decisions. The forth chapter brings the method of EvolutionaryGame into the research of game process and analyze evolutionarily stable strategies of marketsupervisors and participants based on their evolutionary model. After that, we carry on somesimulation experiments with the help of Matlab. Different parameter values cause differentsimulation results and we obtain the influence of different parameters according to results.Finally in the chapter of Conclusion, We put forward some useful suggestions to both financialmarket supervisors and participants in order to promote the standard development of financialmarket.