Empirical Analysis On TDR Price And Its Influencing Factors

This paper starts from the contradictions of China’s farmland preservation tasks and growing demand for construction land, then pointed out that the existing construction land management system has leading to economic inefficiency, resulting in a waste of social resources. In order to break through the limitation, Zhejiang Province carried out a whole new market for construction land quotas trading both in the region and cross-region with a high degree of market freedom from1999, by the existing construction land planning and management system. This paper establishes a standard econometric model, and using more than600survey samples collected from every city in Zhejiang province to indicate the rewarded construction land quotas transaction price formation mechanism, and focus on exploring the impact of government intervention on it. Conclusions are as follows:(1)The resource endowments and economical level of a region determine the role of it as the supply-side or the demand-side, as well as the psychological expectations of the transaction price. Parties to the transaction per capita arable land area decreased will promote the transaction prices; the economic level also affects the level of psychological expectations of the transaction price.(2) From the point of view of time, the rewarded construction land quotas can be seem as exhaustible resources, so trading prices are rising over time trends.(3) The transaction price are influenced by government interventions. The municipal government participates in trading negotiations between two county governments within the region. Administrative intervention in the specific rewarded quotas transaction process will reduce the internal transaction price of prefecture-level city, and the promulgation of the use of quota control policy to curb demand through lower prices, making rewarded quotas market to deviate from the Pareto efficient equilibrium.