Considering The Delivery Date Is Compressed Into Compensation Online Channel Coordination Of Supply Chain Research

With the progressing of the era and the booming of the online shopping,customers are increasingly sensitive to the delivery time. The online retailer in order toattract the more time-sensitive customers invests a lot of money to shorten the deliverytime. The shorter delivery time will make the online retailer provide the service for thecustomers better and fast. But as it well known, compressing the delivery time needsmuch money. So the manufacturer always offers some compensation for benefitingfrom compressing the delivery time of the online retailer. But when the online retailerowns the physical channel, or the traditional retailer owns the online channel, theproblem of investing and compensating is more and more complex. So in this paper,we first research the problem of investing and compensating in the single channelsupply chain, and then we expand this problem to the dual-channel supply chain. Atlast, we design the two-part tariff to coordinate the supply chain.First, we studied the problem of investing and compensating in the single-channelsupply chain. The manufacturer is the leader. We build the Stackelberg game model ofthe online retailer invests to compress the delivery time and the manufacturercompensates for it. Solving this model, we get that the optimal wholesale price, theoptimal selling price, the optimal investment and compensation. And we make thesensitivity analysis for the variables. Finally, we get that the manufacturer offercompensation is better than do not. The behavior of compensating can encourage theinvestment and increase the profits of the online retailer, manufacturer and the wholesupply chain.Second, we studied the duel supply chain which the retailer owns both traditionaland online channel. Solving the problem of how to invest for the retailer and how tocompensation for the manufacturer when the retailer compresses the delivery time inthe online channel. Through the sensitivity analysis, we have the conclusions asfollows. The manufacturer offer compensation is better than do not. In the case ofcompensating, the optimal investment is negative correlation with cross payment sensitivity factor; the optimal compensation is positive correlation with cross paymentsensitivity factor. The optimal investment and compensation are negative correlationwith the waiting cost and the payment sensitivity factor, are positive correlation withthe investment effects factor.Finally, based on the centralized decision, we studied the supply chaincoordination problem. It shows that the centralized decision can optimize the totalprofits of supply chain. The two-part tariff can coordinate the supply chain.