The Research Of The Distribution Method On Technology Innovation Alliance Based On Cooperative Game

Technology innovation alliance aim at integration the decentralized innovationresources and improve the innovation efficiency. There existed a survey showed thatevery company was involved in138alliances which more than80%were innovationalliances in those American companies which there revenue above2billion dollars.Infect, because of the imbalance of distribution profits, the technology innovationalliance always tend to low efficient, even disintegration. Since21stcentury, theresearch of distribution profits on technology innovation alliance follow the path of“coalition of the instability factors--sustainable development and the distribution ofbenefits principle-the use of the shapely value, the core solution countermeasuressolution to explore the distribution of benefits.” However, whether all of the Allianceadapt to the same distribution profits? If not, how the alliance to find the profitsdistribution model? How to determine the specific distribution profits programs? Thisstudy based on the above three questions.Firstly, on the basis of previous studies and social situation, this paper put forwardsthree types of alliance--vertical compact alliance, horizontal loose alliances and theintegration of industry alliance. Secondly, we get analysis to the main principles of thedistribution of benefits through the sustainable development of the alliance, and gofurther research on the connotation and logic. Thirdly, simulation calculation thereasonable models of distribution profits in aspect of supply chain, such as the Shapelyvalue model, the minimum core model, simplified MCRS model and the Nashbargaining model. Fourthly, on the basis of simulation analysis of the characteristics ofeach model, comprehensive analysis of the four types of model, and allocation modelcombined with the different types of technological innovation alliance. Lastly, draw thespecific distribution programs of alliance profits and the related suggests on the basis ofsimulation calculation.The main innovation of the paper lies in the combination of cooperative game model and the technological innovation alliance, analyzing different types of model ofprofit distribution alliance, according to the model’s respective characteristics designingthe distribution of profits program. This study enrich the research content of theallocation mechanism of the interests of the Innovation Alliance, and for the technicalinnovation alliance, perfect interest allocates mechanism and provides a referentialthoughts. For China transition economy and Chinese enterprises to provide reference forpolicy direction. Of course, as with other studies, the article also has some limitations,and discussed in the last part of this, Later and so will research further deepen andrefine.