The Game Analysis Of Interest Link Between Agricultural Leading Enterprises And Farmers

Of the central committee of the communist party of China in 2017,the state council issued by the central "file" number one "the central committee of the communist party of China,the state council on deepening structural reform to speed up agricultural rural agricultural supply side several opinions to the development of new kinetic energy" emphasize to develop the agricultural industrialization,play the role of leading enterprises.Under the call of goverment to undertake the corresponding social responsibility and actively promote the local farmers to become rich,to realize the integration of towns and cities.The leading enterprises are the core of the agricultural industrialization,otherwise it is the most difficult to solve the interests of the relationship between farmers and leading enterprises.First this paper analyzes the model of the "leading enterprises + farmers",because the both sides's disparity and relevant government organization thar is not sufficiently supervisrd lead to the universal default of the leading enterprises and harm the interests of farmers.In order to improve the model's weaknesses,we analyze the "leading enterprises +intermediary organization + farmer" and how to improve the study performance rate of booking farming and the interests of farmers about the intermediary organization;Further more game theory is employed to discuss two modes of leading enterprise,farmers income,and the order of performance situation.Finally,to test the authenticity of intermediary organizations,we visited the shuguang group in Changtu county,Liaoning province,which confirmed the advantage of the model of"leading enterprises + intermediary organization + farmer".This paper applies the theory of industrial organization to study how to use the incentive mechanism into promoting the participation of leading enterprises and reducing the cost of enterprises,so as to better service for the industrialization.This paper describes the necessity of replacing the household contract responsibility system with the system changes and provides theoretical support for agricultural industrialization.The transaction cost is used to explain that the intervention of the government,cooperative and other intermediary organizations can reduce the transaction cost of both parties.Based on the principal-agent theory to explain the mediation organization involved that can reduce default behavior,which is advantageous to the long-term cooperation between the two sides and so on four aspects to study the interests of the relationship between leading enterprise and farmers.Using evolutionary game analysis,through the comparative study on"leading enterprises + farmers","leading enterprises + intermediary organization(government)farmers" two organization mode and organization mode of leading enterprises and farmers,and government benefit gambling relations,thus to put forward the reasonable Suggestions for our country's agricultural industrialization.The research is divided into four parts.The research content is as follows:The first part is the introduction.This paper mainly includes the background and significance of the research,the research achievements and development trends at home and abroad,the research methods,and finally the paper summarizes the key points,difficulties and innovation points of this pape.The second part clearly defines the agriculture industrialization and the agricultural industrialization leading enterprise definition.As the theoretical basis of this study,it introduces the four principles of the role of the leading enterprises in the second chapter.The institutional change theory and industrial organization illustrate the trend of industrialization and the role of leading enterprises in the industrialization from the macro level.And the transaction costs and the principal-agent theory illustrate the "leading enterprises + intermediary organization(government)+ farmer" pattern the necessity and advantage of from the perspective of intermediary organizations;The third chapter mainly elaborates the relationship between the interests of leading enterprises and farmers in China.The third part is the key of the paper,and it introduced the two kinds of organization modes about "leading enterprises + farmers","leading enterprises ?intermediary organization(government)farmers".And it analyzes the interests among the governments,enterprises and farmers under the two models by using of evolutionary game theory method.The psper studied the interest between government regulation and non-supervision of the initiative of the leading enterprises,which is an innovation point.In the context of specific cases and based on the analysis of game analysis,the paper analyzes the two organizational models better.The fourth part is the conclusion and suggestions.It is mainly expatriated about the reputation,increasing the cost of default,perfecting the information sharing,Special investment,strengthening the supervision of the government.In the end,it provids tips and advice on the interests of the mechanism and development between the leading enterprises and farmers.