The Game Analysis Of Interests In Agricultural Land Expropriation From The Perspective Of Institutional Economics

According to our Constitution and the Law of Land Administration, land requisition is the governmental behavior that for the public interests, the government or country mandatorily and lawfully expropriates the land and compensates landless people.With the acceleration of industrialization and urbanization process in China, many rural collective lands are requisitioned for state construction land and the land requisition act with the nature of non-public interest is spreading.Although the current land requisition system plays an important role in economic development in the specific historical period, originated in the planned economy era, it has been unable to meet the change of economic environment at this stage. The government has made some modifications in different periods according to the different needs of economic, but throughout the entire process, it is nothing more than "tinkering" for individual parts and not related to the nature of the land requisition system.In the process of land requisition, the landless peasants, as a disadvantaged group, are at the low level of the land acquisition structure. Despite the fact that a large number of peasants lost their lands, because there exist some defects, such as incomplete rural land property rights, high cost for the access to information and invalid supervision, their rights cannot be well protected. Even when they clearly recognize the interests are violated, they still can not take effective measures to solve it. Because of the unrestricted land acquisition act, many peasants has been essentially reduced to "landless, unemployment, no social security" victims.The paper analyses the condition of damage to the farmers’interests in the rural land requisition process in the perspective of institutional economics with a method combined with economics analysis and empirical research.Property Right Theory, Transaction Cost Theory, principal-agent theory are used to analyze deep-seated reasons why farmers’ interests can not get effective protection, and Evolutionary Game Theory is applied as a means to clearly analyze allocation mechanism of the interests in the process of agricultural land requisition in order to put forward the protection mechanism of the farmers’ interests in the rural collective land requisition process in the view of institutional economics and Game Theory.The paper is divided into six chapters.Chapter One mainly poses the research questions, reviews the researches related to the land requisition and describes research objectives, content, the possible innovation as well as weakness.Chapter Two introduces the theoretical basis of Institutional Economics, including Property Right Theory, Principal-agent Theory and Transaction Cost Theory, paving the theoretical basis for the violated interests of farmers in the perspective of Institutional Economics.Chapter Three static game analysis of the all parties’interests in the rural collective land requisition is made, including:static game assumptions, the payoff function of all parties in the static game and corresponding measures taken. Weakness of Evolutionary Game Analysis is finally pointed out, laying the foundation for the next chapter.Chapter Four Evolutionary Game Analysis of all parties’interest of the rural collective land requisition is done, including:the basic complement of Evolutionary Game Theory for Static Game, the profits function of all parties in the Evolutionary Game Theory, analysis of benefits influencing factors in game land acquisition process based on Evolutionary Game Theory.Chapter Five Based on Institutional Economics and Evolutionary Game basis, it empirically analyzes the violated interests and the distribution of benefits in the rural land requisition in a country of Sichuan Province as well as make some related policy suggestions.Chapter six is a Summary.It is an entent of the theory analys and enample analys.This chapter finds out the problems those exist in the land requisition. Then based on the problems, point out some suggestions on how to solve those problems.