The Study On China’s Listed Company Managers’ Salary Incentive Mechanism Based On EVA

In an increasingly incentive market competition environment, enterprise to survival anddevelopment must establish modern enterprise management system. One of the main features ofthe modern enterprise management system is the separation between enterprise property andmanagement. Enterprises in the separation of two rights condition, to seek long-termdevelopment must solve the principal-agent both target uninformization problem. And the coreof EVA thought is shareholder wealth maximization, EVA as a performance measurement indexto the enterprise managers for salary incentive can not only good to motivate managers playentrepreneur talent, and effectively protect the shareholders’ rights and interests, is moreadvantageous to the enterprise in the future development.This paper, from the perspective of EVA, listed companies on China’s manager salaryincentive mechanism explored. In the listed companies on China’s annual salary incentive andstock incentive based on the analysis of the present situation, China’s real estate industry as anexample, through empirical analysis, and further reveals the manager annual salary and EVAsays performance of the inner link between. Research proves, managers’ salary is mainly affectedby the influence of the scale of the enterprise, and enterprise EVA has weak correlation; Andthere exist certain degree of incentive after effect, but the effect was not significant. Finally, thispaper will non-financial indicators combined with EVA, further improve the EVA salaryincentive scheme.