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Venture Capital Firm And Venture Enterprise Matching Research Based On The Theory Of Life Cycle

Posted on:2013-07-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F YangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2269330392968492Subject:Technical Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the rapid development of science and technology and the globalization of the knowledge economy speeding up, in order to meet the more intense challenge, we should rapidly improve the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises. And from now to participate in world competition and keep the advantage basically is state-owned or major support from the state enterprises, private enterprise is few. Throughout the rest of the world economic development process, risk investment in this process plays a key role, because of the risk investment operation mechanism and the objective to differ completely with the bank, they favor the development potential of large and high investment risk of venture enterprises. But because of the risk of investment failure rate is very high, in order to make the risk enterprises develop better so as to promote the economic development, we must take effective measures to improve the success rate of risk investment. This article is aimed at this problem made exploratory study.This article is base on the game theory of branch matching theory, study risk investment as a whole. According to the feature of different development phase of venture enterprises and venture capital cooperation motivation put a question on different stages of development matching problem, then according to the Vc firm and venture enterprise on the ideal partner expectations, and risk investment intermediary objective evaluation to establish specific interval number and fuzzy interval model, calculate the amount of information for different subjects in different evaluation index, according to the amount of information minimization, eliminated projects with large amount of information. Finally, a multi-objective optimization model is built, and calculate the risk of investment in a single direction optimization scheme, which considers only the Vc firm optimal solution and considering only the risk enterprise optimal solution, and through the membership functions of the weighted summation, get the overall optimal solution, for reaching the final match results.Through this analysis we can know, in the case of information symmetry between finite Vc firm and venture enterprise there is a balanced situation, in the absence any subject has a optimal choice or a better one.
Keywords/Search Tags:Bilateral matching, Axiom, Life cycle, Cooperative motivation
PDF Full Text Request
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