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Analysis Of Multiple Game Of The Private Coal Mine Accidents In China

Posted on:2008-01-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W W JieFull Text:PDF
GTID:2199360242469068Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years, coal mine accidents occur frequently in China. Although at the end of May 2007, the state safety supervision Office and the National Coal Mine Safety Control noticed 9104 as a total closure of the shaft list, the closure of illegal private coal mines has accumulated to 8,884, according to the data in March this year showed that some provinces and municipalities have rebounded to 30 people died in more than a special two major accidents, 61 people died, the situation remains grim. From statistical data, the coal mining accidents occurred more than 90% of all private coal mines, compared with the state-owned coal mines, most of the private mines are illegal and have no security or safety production license production is not in place. However, in the country's stringent enforcement, why do these private coal mines still continue despite being banned? In this paper, game theory is introduced to analyze the relationship between state-owned coal mine with the private coal mine, in an attempt to identify the private coal mine production inputs affect the essential acts, and found that rent-seeking behavior of private coal mines despite repeated prohibition is one of the main reasons, and giving proposals from the leasing, government regulation, safety input and safety awareness aspects etc. for the private coal mine management.This paper is divided into four chapters.The first chapter is introduction. After putting forward a frequent occurrence in China coal mine accidents, the private coal mine after this issue and there are a lot of scholars in the field of academic research works are classified as a reference for this argument, and then established the paper's methodology, the final structure of this chapter was to sort out and concluded.The second chapter is divided into two sections. The first quarter analyzes the existence of China's private coal mine conditions and characteristics, summed up the status quo in reducing the problem of the private coal mine, but rebound phenomenon, the private coal mines despite repeated prohibition. Then the characteristics of China's private coal mines were summarized. The other section of the private coal accident followed multiple reasons for a preliminary analysis of profits from mining, "officials colluded with coal," a law enforcement perspective, the poverty of peasant workers carried out a five demonstration.The third chapter introduces game theory knowledge to analyze the game relations between the state-owned coal mine and the private coal mine. It is the focus and innovation of this paper. This chapter is divided into two sections; the first section is about the basic principles of game theory. Following the introduction, this paper induced the Game relations between the private and state-owned coal mine to be complete information dynamic game types. Section two, in a series of assumptions, the model introduced Stackelberg model to discuss leasing costs, wages, the government regulatory and safety factors such as input of the private actors of mine, so as to find a solution to provide the right direction.The fourth chapter is on the basis of analyzing two main game objects state-owned coal mine and the private coal mine with a combination of domestic and international coal mine safety experiences in the treatment of advanced, the solution proposed a series of measures and corresponding recommendations. Concrete from the leasing, government regulation, safety input and safety awareness to be taken in the thinking and exploration.At the conclusion of this paper is on the basis of mine safety predecessors research results, further research and authentication is conducted. The innovation in this paper lies in the perspective of game theory to conduct feasibility studies and introducing the relevant research tools, such as Stackelberg model to analyze the dynamic game relations between state-owned coal mines and private coal mine, so the result is more objective and proof credible. In addition, because of the personal abilities and paper scope is limited, this paper might be deficiencies, for example, analysis of the other main game objects is not included, such as relations between workers, the government and coal enterprises etc., thus inviting experts, teachers and industry for understanding.
Keywords/Search Tags:Private Coal Mine, Coal Mine Safety, Leasing, Dynamic Game
PDF Full Text Request
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