Research On The Screening Mechanism Of Housing Security Object

Housing security is a key part in the whole social security system, and as a public policy adopted by most of the developed countries in the world. It is an essential social policy about government redistribution, and also a complement for the market-oriented of housing distribution system. At present, our housing security policy is still focus on the large-scale construction, while less on administer of housing allocation. In recent years many events have been questioning housing security system, such as the false housing application deeds cannot be discovered, and it critically threatened the society’s fairness and justice. How can we find the right applicant and eliminate the illegal behaviors to the limited housing resources is a real challenge for our county.The full text can be divided into five parts, besides the introduction:the first part (the second chapter) is related to the basics of the theories. Based on the accurate definition the concept of housing security, the information screening system of housing security applicant, we illustrate the related asymmetric information theory, housing filtration theory, government responsibility theory. Considering housing security screening criteria is unreasonable, and trying to efficiently allocate resources to target the hands of housing groups, we need to discuss the Game relations of housing allocation audit and analysis the game process. The second part (chapter3), before explaining the case, we establish a housing security dynamic game model, based on the assumption, which will determine the screening model, type, and the demands by the government and affordable housing game behavior of both sides. For this non-cooperative game model, applicants conduct strategic analysis of pure and mixed strategy analysis, and then we can draw the influence of the penalties, the strength of audit, the cost of the false application and the housing subsidies on the applicant behavior. The third part (chapter4) discussing the Singapore’s successful experience and inspiration, and Summarize deficiencies and improve our screening mechanism. The fourth part (chapter5), Discussing the development of housing security in Xi’an. By applying the model above, information and conditions are summarized on the structure, analysis the experimental results. The fifth part (chapter6). according to the situation of housing security and empirical result, we give our suggestions:the information screening system must include the establishment of the evaluation criteria, the reinforcement of the examination and supervision, the building of the guarantor system and the enhancement of the penalizing system institution for housing security system. The guarantee institution claims the applicant to provide a eligible guarantor who can offer guarantee statement required by government. Anyone who supplies wrong information to deceit the security house would receive severe punishment and a bad record in their credit files by housing security departments in charge, which could largely raise their cost and depress possibility of the deceptions application behavior. The innovation of this paper are discussed as:(1) analysis of the structure and elements of housing security object discrimination mechanism;(2) screening information theory of information economics model is set up to analyze audit system loophole;(3) Put forward and implement mechanism of system construction and systematic。...