The Theory And Empirical Research Of Average Bid Method

With the development of the bidding system, In the role of policy and environmental situation, Average Bid Method is widely used in project bidding around our country in the implementation process of Low Bid Method, which is the deformable body of Low Bid Method. At present, this auction mechanism is widely used in construction engineering in China, however, the study of theoretical and empirical analysis of this auction mechanism are few.Therefore,from the view of a virtual bidder,this paper discusses bidding behavior of construction companies in construction engineering,which forms empirical analysis and empirical analysis. Based on the young and middle-aged teachers in Fujian province education scientific research project:The equilibrium and efficiency of the project procurement based on evaluation methods of Fujian province,the paper conducted the following research。In theoretical research, this paper firstly introduces the definition of Average Bid Method, universal model and equilibrium analysis of common models. This paper analyzes the application of Average Bid Method in China. It’s found that the number of provinces, which are using this auction or other variations, counts about 60%.And then universal model must be summed up and state of equilibrium must be simulation of comparative analysis between Average Bid Method and Low Bid Method.Secondly, according to the definition of Average Bid Method, first price auction with ex-post screening used in Xiamen from 2009 is introduced and analyzed. Hence, bid evaluation method used in Xiamen from 2009 can be considered as one kind of average bid methods. The optimal solution of this method is solved by linear programming model. This paper discusses the D of its benchmark evaluation, the relationship between D and cost price early warning. The result of this model shows that there is no equantequation in bids of that auction.In empirical analysis, this paper starting from the cases of Xiamen construction engineering bidding, summarized and analized the records of bid which kept on record in Xiamen in order to verify the theoretical analysis. After that, Monte Carlo simulation is used to simulate the bidding behavior and non-price behavior in Xiamen’s mechanism. The optimal solution of this method must be simulated based on cases. The result shows Average Bid Method could not make bidders to submit their real prices,and resources can not be allocated ineffectively.Both Monte Carlo simulation and MATLAB programming are used to design interface for the whole process of the optimal solution simulation based on Xiamen’s First Price Auction with Ex-post Screening. Bidding data from 2009 of Xiamen is used to verify the rationality of conclusions above.According to the study, the ratio of price and total price alert relate to the simulation results closely. In addition, the range of bidding price are larger and the part of theoretical research is verified reasonably.Finally, comparative analysis is presented between Average Bid Method and Low Bid Method in terms of the definition, characteristics, application, price and non-price behavior behavior, which combined with theoretical analysis and empirical data analysis section.The result of price behavior analysis shows that Average Bid Method made a compromise in terms of price.And Average Bid Method could not make bidders to submit their real prices, and encourages bidders to raise prices.Compared to Low Bid Method, he result of non-price behavior analysis shows that collusion motivation is stronger and the difficulty of collusion can be smaller based on Average Bid Method, as such, the results verified the theoretical analysis and empirical results.