Research On European Regional Security Public Goods Supply Under American Intervention

Regional public goods theory considers that through regional cooperation among relevant states by constructing regional mechanisms, which featured with clearly defined rights and responsibilities, and distributing cost-benefit transparently, they will be able to effectively solve the key problems in international public goods supply, namely "free-ride" and "privatization". However, comparing with the success on the supply of regional economic public goods for Europe, European countries failed to achieve an effective supply of public goods on regional security.This paper indicates the point that conflict between international public goods supply, dominated by the hegemony, and regional public goods supply, conducted by countries of a region, is the crucial perspective to explain the inadequate supply of regional security public goods in current Europe. Concentrating on the core question:How the intervention of hegemony affects regional security public goods supply? The paper argues that once intervened by a superpower, the regional security public goods supply model will depend on the power structure within it. Specifically, whether there is an intra-regional supply center is the decisive factor for regional security public goods supply model under the intervention of hegemony:When there is no intra-regional supply center, the regional security public goods supply will be in a hegemony-dominated mode. If a potential supply center is emerging within the district, the regional security public goods supply will be in a competitive mode. In the tertiary situation, where an intra-regional supply center has been established, the regional security public goods supply will be in a complementary mode.To test this hypothesis, the paper will expand a process tracing on European regional security public goods supply under American intervention (The main cases include the NATO crisis in 1966, the formation and development of the CSCE, and the construction of the ESDP after the Cold War). The results reinforce the point that despite the existence of a close alliance between the United States and Europe, the U. S. adopted a cooperative stance only in the 1970s, the peak period of its adversary, the Soviet Union, and accepted the complementary mode of security public goods supply, and hence the CSCE to be held. However, in other periods, for the European countries’ pursuits in providing regional security public goods autonomously, the United States took the position to refuse (hegemony-dominated mode) or hinder (competitive mode). After the Cold War, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the contradiction between the US strategic object of hegemonic order maintenance and the national security interests of European countries becomes more intense. European regional security public goods supply under American intervention has reverted to the previous competitive mode. Whether Europe could eventually change the status of insufficient supply of regional security public goods and achieve the complementarity supply with the United States depends on whether the EU could accomplish the Common Security and Defence Policy by establishing its independent military capacity, and become an autonomous and stable intra-regional supply center ultimately.