Research About The "Nail Households" In The Expropriation And Compensation Of Buildings On State-owned Land

Urbanization is inevitable in China’s modernization process. It’s not only anational fight for social progress, but also an important means for citizens to seek ahappy life. To levy urban housing is a process that we can’t avoid in the urbanizationprocess. During the process, different stakeholders are involving, which caused muchfriction of benefits, how to effectively resolve these benefits friction? Solving the“nail household” is one of the key issues, which is also difficult. To analyze the causeof "nail household" and the game strategy between "nail household" and localgovernments from the perspective of the Institutional Economics is the topic of thisarticle.The thesis is divided into six chapters; the main content of each chapter is asfollows:The main content in the first chapter was Issues raised, as well as an introductionto the reality of thesis and writing background and significance.The second chapter is definition of "nail household", as well as a review of therelevant literature.In the third chapter, the author from the current collection system, combined withinstitutional economics theory, and the causes of "nail household" are discussed.According to the fact whether the person concerned lose, the “nail house” can bedivided into active “nail household" and passive “nail household”, The former comesfrom the logic that under the current levy system, the housing levy will bringsignificant rental value of land, and related systems and no portion of this is attributedto the rental value of a viable, which is not clearly defined. To maximize their owninterests, the two sides levied will have opportunistic tendencies, and they are allgoing to chase the benefit. The latter comes from the fact that their own interests havebeen infringed. In addition, the chapter also discusses the rental value "nail house"problems caused by dissipation problems from economic efficiency perspective.The fourth chapter is based on the Mark Rubinstein (Mark Rubinstein) classicmodel, which is about the actual situation " nail household " problem, in which themodel is introduced in judicial decisions and imposed of "brinkmanship" on the RubinStan model, the nail household " in the bargaining process is divided into a full game,the threat of a two-stage, constructed a "bargaining-threat" game model to this gamemodel is based on the "nail house" in question levy departments and be imposed ("nail household ") of behavioral strategies were analyzed, and draw conclusions value ofthe house is easily underestimated.Chapter Five is case studies, which use cases to describe game theoreticalanalysis model in the previous section, and demonstrate the relevant conclusions.Chapter VI is the conclusion of the paper.