Research On Risk Identification And Evasion Mechanism Of The Main Risk In Outsourcing Of Public Services

With the development of economy, the demand of public service is increasing, the drawbacks of the traditional single-supply pattern by government which is low efficiency and high cost are prominent day by day. In this context, outsourcing of public service rapid development in China reckon on particular advantages, gradually become a way of modern management to improve public service quantity, quality and supply efficiency for the governments at all levels. Though the outsourcing of public service has such advantages, the government has to face various risks due to the several unfavourable factors. Therefore, the research on outsourcing of public services risk issues has a great significance.In view of this, integrating the risk management theory, with the new public management theory, transaction cost theory and principal agent theory; this dissertation took "Research on Risk Identification and Evasion Mechanism of the Main Risk in Outsourcing of Public Services"as research subjects on the basic of the existing research. The main research contents and results are as follows:First, through the literature comb, eight critical risk factors are extracted, that is, the contractor’s opportunism risk and monopoly risk, the government’s management ability risk and rent-seeking risk, Business standardization risk and scalability risk, contract completeness risk, external environment risk, and 25 risk variables. Based on the existing research on service outsourcing risk factors effect pathway, it put forward some relevant theoretical assumption, and a theoretical model of risk factors effect pathway of outsourcing of public services.Second, based on investigates the relevant government staff who responsible for outsourcing of public services and get the data, it carries out validity and reliability test by SPSS22 and test the proposed theoretical model and the path supposes by LISREL8.7.The analysis results show that some risk factors have influence on the risk results directly, some will influence the risk results through affecting the other risks.Third, using the classical signaling theory and the different choice of punish level by public service contractor, this paper starts off to progress game analysis on risk circumvention mechanism in the stage of contractor selection. And then, this paper analyzes the relative parameters affect the risk of the contractor supervision stage by establishing of game model. At last, the model considered the influence on the risk of the contractor supervision stage by the citizen participation and competition between contractors.