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The Local Government And Farmers In The Implementation Of The Farmers’ Centralized Housing Policy

Posted on:2017-03-17Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:C L AiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2296330488486147Subject:Foreign political system
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The development of rural areas has two ways, one is driven by the internal forces of the countryside; the other is to rely on external forces to promote. Due to the decentralized organization of farmers and the vulnerability of the internal forces in rural areas, relying on the inner power to solve the problem of rural development is very difficult. Therefore, at present, relying on external forces to solve the problems of rural development is the best policy. This external force is dominated by government forces. However, there are adaptive problems of the external forces into the rural areas. If the external forces, regardless of the specific situation of the rural areas and forced injection, then not only will not play a role in promoting, but also retrograde the development of rural areas. The farmers’centralized housing policy is another measure led by the government to solve the rural problems, but the measure can in the Agriculture as the main areas to achieve win-win in urban and rural areas of the original intention of the government or not, it is a worth pondering problem.In this paper, we take two villages in the eastern part of Shandong Province that agriculture is the major industry as the research object and introduce the theory of the game theory,Case study and "process-event" to try to outline the whole operation of the picture of the local government to promote The farmers’centralized housing policy.The author focuses on the preliminary planning stage of the residence, the specific implementation stage of the residence and the late of the the residence. The first stage, the local government predicted farmers response to formulate specific policies;the first,farmers do not oppose but make the greatest efforts to promote their own interests maximization. The second stage, farmers had different responses in response to the government’s policy:the vast majority of farmers adopted a cooperative strategy, and only a few farmers did not cooperate, which also happened to fulfill the local government forecast. But whether farmers cooperate or not, all of them launched a game of intrigue with the local government. The third stage, after the game between local government and the farmers, the farmers who refused to migration and who moved back maintain the status, both sides stalemate continues. The author believes that the implementation process of the farmers’ centralized housing policy reflected the game between local government and farmers and the interest was the starting point for both parties to take measures.Due to the obvious disadvantage of the farmers in terms of law,organization,information an so an;Farmers due to the in laws, the degree of organization and information obviously at a disadvantage while local policies on legal, in the policy formulation, the degree of organization and information at a advantage, coupled with the lack of the central government and the village committee game role, lead to local governments in the implementation of centralized residence often ignored the specific situation of rural,and did not respect the dominant position of farmers and infringed upon the lawful rights and interests of farmers. So,the conditions for the policy of Centralized residence of farmers in the agricultural areas are not sufficient.
Keywords/Search Tags:The farmers’ centralized housing policy, Agriculture as the main areas, Game Theory, Interest
PDF Full Text Request
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