The Interests Of Game Theory, Public Policy Implementation Bias Problem

Based on the internal and external implementation theories and the current situation of political operation system in China, this paper studied the deviation phenomenon in the process of policy implementation in China. Combined with the practice of policy implementation in China, it made a specific analysis of the implication, performances and risks of the deviation of policy implementation, and probed the causes which led to the deviation of policy implementation. Finally, it put forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions to prevent the deviation in policy implementation and to improve the efficiency of the policy implementation.The interest game is one of the extremely important perspectives to study the issues of public policy. Public policies are not only the confirmation forms of the interests, but also the tools to adjust the interests as well as the programs of distribution. Due to the scarcity of resources, "homo oeconomicus" and the defects in the chain of principle-agency, the deviation will appeared in public policy implementation. This paper considered the relations of interest game in the process of public policy implementation as the subject, used "Cross-Game" as the main analytical tools, explained the relations of interest games between the persons or departments who are responsible the policy implementation from the vertical and horizontal dimensions, and demonstrated the game strategies between the persons or departments who are responsible the policy implementation policy implementation by the examples of policy analysis.The non-cooperative game of the policy implementation arose from people's inherent impulse in pursuit of their own maximizing interests, so it is necessary to integrate their interests if we want to transform the non-cooperative game into the cooperative game. The systems based on the integration of the interests are designed as follows: clear property rights, reasonable definition of the interests of the policy implementation subjects, coordination of the interests between the policy subjects and objectives, the intensity of punishment for game acts of irregularities. Through designing external systems, constraining the game behavior and initiating cooperation, we will reduce the deviation in the policy implementation and ultimately achieve policy objectives.