Matching Capabilities And Selection Of University-Industry Corporation’s Technology Type

University-industry Corporation is an important way to enhance the technologicalcapabilities of enterprises and an important component of China’s innovation system. Ourinnovative system to promote research cooperation has been set up nearly two decades,though with great success, but still cannot get out of the predicament of low level cooperation.Chinese scholars have done a lot of research in this area; however they are still unable to findout underlying causes for low-level equilibrium Cooperative. Scholars have stressed the roleimportance of government in promoting university-industry Corporation, but rarely have theydemonstrated the incentive means government should take by standardized methods.Based on the reality of the current University-industry Corporation situation, takingability difference and goals difference of the roles in University-industry as the starting point,embedding the main innovation body in collaborative research agency theory, by building adynamic game model of collaborative innovation, this article compares equilibrium outcomeof one-stage stage and two-stage game model, and demonstrate the causes why companiesalways tend to low level equilibrium cooperation of product technology. Comparing balancedoutcomes, we find out those choices companies made on the type of technology forUniversity-industry Corporation changing with their technology capabilities, and with theincreasing of technology capabilities, the changing route of their choices will follow producttechnology to Applications to common technology and to technology evolution path at last. Subsequent analyses of social welfare indicate that it’s impossible to achieve social welfaremaximization (Pareto optimal) under natural selection for two reasons: First, there exists goaldifference between the two sides; Second, the moral hazard. Based on Pareto optimal, thispaper gets the capability matching principle in University-industry Corporation: enterpriseswith low technical capacity will cooperate with university of low R&D capabilities inproducts; mid-level enterprises will cooperate with mid-level university in common theapplicative technology; high technology companies will choose high R&D capabilityuniversities cooperate in common technology. But academic preference in universities is adouble edged sword, if preference is high, then it is not conducive to achieve ability match,otherwise, it is not conducive to reach collaborative innovation and research goals. Based on inefficient equilibrium outcome in cooperative game, the paper introducesgovernment-funding to establish three University-industry Corporation innovation dynamicgame models under government subsidies, and the results show government subsidies willlead University-industry Corporation technology move forward to common technical level;and if the government want to develop applicative common technologies, they shouldsubsidize universities; if they wish to develop generic technologies then they should subsidizeenterprises. Besides, it is proved that government funding will improve social welfare, but thelevel of enhancing will vary due to subsidies means. Subsequently, we define the efficiencyvariable of the subsidy to measure the pros and cons of three subsidies means. Furtherconclusions are: when University-industry corporate on product technology, thegovernment’s best option is to subsidize enterprise output; when is the applicative commontechnologies, the optimal choice for government subsidies is to subsidize college output;when cooperate on common technology, the best option is to subsidize government R&Dinvestment.