Research On The Existing Buildings Energy-saving Renovation Economic Incentive Policy Based On Game Analysis

The contract energy management is implemented in developed countries universally andused the market means to promote energy-saving as service mechanism. The research object ofthis paper is the existing buildings energy-saving renovation in the hot summer and cold winterprovinces. This paper introduces the mote of contract energy management, makes the existingbuildings energy-saving renovation into the market, researches its main market and operationmode. It uses economic theory, analyzes that the existing buildings energy-saving renovation hasexternalities and economic attributes of quasi-public goods. It is these attributes lead to the―market failure‖. It is necessary to the government to take positive and effective economicincentive policies to guide the market mechanism to play effectively.Firstly, this paper uses the evolutionary game theory, establishes evolutionary game model,analyzes the decision options of government and energy-saving service company respectively,analyzes their dynamic evolution path by―replicated dynamic equation‖, and gets the―evolutionary stable strategy‖. Through analyzing the evolutionary game dynamic evolutiontrend chart of the government and energy-saving service company, put forward thecorresponding economic incentive policy suggestions.Then, this paper uses the principal-agent theory, researches the economic incentive strengthof the government. The government needs to use the limited financial fund to play the biggestincentive effect, and grasp the incentive strength reasonably. If the incentive strength is too small,it cannot meet the incentive effect. If the incentive strength is too large, it will result in a waste ofthe central government funds. The research of incentive strength is a part of the incentivemechanism design. This paper uses the principal-agent theory, in meeting participation constraintand incentive compatibility constraint, establishes the principal-agent economic incentive model,researches the optimal incentive contract when the enterprise effort level can be observed and notobserved, gets the corresponding optimal incentive strength.Finally, this paper uses experience empirical analysis method, analyzes the economicincentive policies of contract energy management project in Shanghai. Based on the research ofthe successful case in Shanghai, examine the rationality of the optimal incentive mechanismmodel. With the aim to follow the economic incentive policies in Shanghai, combined withcharacteristics of the existing buildings energy-saving renovation in the hot summer and coldwinter provinces, put forward the corresponding economic incentive policy suggestions.