Research On The Models Of The Premium And Penalty Mechanisms Of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Government-Leading

Recently, the haze weather occurred in many parts of country frequently, whicharoused the intense discuss about increasingly serious environmental pollution of thenature; while, industrial pollution and heavy metal pollution is one of the importantcauses of the phenomenon, and the waste electrical and electronic products pollutionoccupies a important position; in recent years, the recovery and remanufacture ofwaste electrical and electronic products issued by government departments,environmentalists and so on, so it has become a urgent problems to majorization andadjust the non-standard methods and ways about the recovery of and remanufacturingexisting waste electrical and electronic products in our country. Thus, the traditionalforward supply chain evolution for the reverse supply chain or closed-loop supplychain, and government has become the leader of the closed-loop supply chain, the keyto coordinate and develop the closed-loop supply chain; its dominance decides thedecisions and enthusiasm for recycling of other members in closed-loop supply chain.In order to study the premium and penalty mechanisms of waste electrical andelectronic products closed-loop supply chain which is under manufacturer-leading orgovernment-leading, this thesis uses operations research, game theory andoptimization theory, etc. Given the number of manufactures in the market, the thesisbuilds the price-decision and production-decision model respectively. The thesisestablishes manufacturer-leading and government-leading game models on duopoly ofmanufacturers, government-leading the game models considering the responsibilitysharing, considering three kinds of government revenue function: the environmentalbenefit, the income of the enterprise and the whole society interest. On the basis ofsolving the4models conscientiously, get the following conclusions: the premium andpenalty mechanism can effectively improve the recovery rate and the proceeds of themembers; government-leading form is better than manufacturer-leading form fromprice, recovery rate and income, the interests of the whole society governmentfunction form is superior to the environmental benefit and enterprise benefit form;responsibility sharing coefficient and the number of manufacturers has a decisiveinfluence to whether implement the responsibility sharing; the premium and penaltymechanisms is protective to market leader manufacturer, retailer and the third partycollector, while is conditional to the market follower manufacturers.