Research On Decision Of Closed-loop Supply Chain Under Government Premium And Penalty Based On Different Power Structure

As the global environmental pollution and resources shortage becoming increasingly serious, various countries paid more and more attention to environmental protection and resource recycle development. The closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) which combined the forward and reverse supply chain, aimed to maximize the product life cycle followed the circulation economic theory. It was received extensive attention of government and academia because of its feature that reducing the production cost of enterprises and achieving the recycling of products. In recent years, the government has increased the attention to environmental protection, and introduced relevant policies and regulations to command companies to proceed recycling and remanufacturing activities. Further more, the government provide subsidies to recyclers for stimulating.Research on CLSC has made many achievements and the existing research is mainly about pricing and coordination, the studies on government intervention are rare. The CLSC considering government intervention’s influence is more realistic meaning. This paper is based on the analysis and summary of predecessors’existing research results, to study the decision under government premium and penalty based on different power structure of CLSC by means of building model and quantitative analysis method.The main work of this paper is as follow:Firstly, to expound the background and significance of the selected topic, and determine the research method and the content of this paper. The reverse supply chain and CLSC which relating to the research were introduced as well as relevant literature is reviewed, and some problems of the current research is indicated.Secondly, this paper constructs a CLSC model consisting of a single manufacture and a single retailer considering retailer collecting, to research the impact of government implements premium and penalty for manufacturers and retailers respectively on the decision and profits of centralized decision-making, as well as manufacturers and retailers Nash equilibrium game, manufacturer-Stackelberg and retailer-Stackelberg.Using optimization theory and method to solve the centralized decision-making model, to solve the six kinds of decentralized decision-making model by Stackelberg game theory. The optimal decision variables, member’s profit as well as total profits were compared. Focused on the impact of government implements premium and penalty for above variables and the profits of members. The research shows that the mechanism can enhance the income of CLSC as well as increase the environmental benefits. Our research results enrich the field of CLSC about government interference. And provide some enlightenment for government management.Finally, to summarize the main conclusions of text and the contributions, the shortcomings of this study was exposed also.